The Doha Round by Messerlin, Patrick
 
Policy Brief 
October  2010 
 
The Doha Round 
Patrick A. Messerlin 1
I. Introduction 
 
The “Doha Round” may be finished in 2011, more than ten years after having 
been officially launched.2  A detailed description of the negotiations over such a long 
period goes far beyond the scope of a chapter, and would require a book.3  Rather, this 
chapter focuses on the four key questions faced by the Doha Round, and indeed by every 
future Round. 
Firstly, what is the “value” of a Round?  The long negotiating process has fueled 
the wide perception that the Doha Round is not worth it.  Section I shows that this 
perception is wrong by looking at the three alternative dimensions capturing the value of 
a Round; (1) a Doha Round concluded by 2010−2011 would be as productive as the 
previous Rounds; (2) the existing draft texts of a Doha Agreement would bring welfare 
gains amounting to roughly USD 300 to 700 billion if one includes all the topics under 
negotiation; and (3) the Doha Round has this unique capacity to deliver legally binding 
commitments, that is, to provide the certainty so crucial to the business community 
(Wallenberg, 2006).  This capacity is reflected by the costs that a definitive failure of the 
Doha Round would impose on world trade (a fall of 8 to 10 percent) and on the world 
GDP (a loss of USD 900 billion). 
                                                 
1 Forthcoming in A. Lukauskas, R. M. Stern, and G. Zanini (eds.), Handbook of Trade 
Policy for Development, Oxford University Press. 
 
2 Strictly speaking, there is no Doha Round as such. The negotiations are being held under an 
awkward title—the “Doha Development Agenda” (DDA)—as explained below.  However, for 
simplicity sake, this chapter will use both the terms DDA and Doha Round. 
3 See, in particular, Ismael (2009) from an insider perspective and Blustein (2009) from an 
outsider perspective.  See also the huge amount of detailed information provided on a regular 
basis by a few websites, in particular of the WTO and ICTSD. 
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Secondly, should one tightly link trade negotiations with broader concepts—
development in the case of the Doha Round (it could be climate change in the next 
Round)?  Section III argues that this is a costly and ultimately disappointing approach.  It 
has absorbed the first four years of the Doha Round (from the 1999 Seattle Ministerial to 
the 2003 Cancun Ministerial) with little, if any, result.  It has generated excessive 
expectations ending up in unnecessary disillusionment.  Last but not least, it is still 
imposing costly constraints on the current negotiations.  A Round is above all a 
negotiating process.  That does not mean that development (or climate change) concerns 
should not be present in the minds of the trade negotiators.  But the multilateral trade 
framework has enough means to address such concerns, without injecting them directly 
into the core of the negotiations. 
Thirdly, which is the objective of a Round?  The answer looks obvious:  trade 
liberalization.  But the Doha Round shows that this answer is not precise enough.  In 
sharp contrast with the previous Rounds, the Doha Round has been preceded by years of 
unilateral and preferential liberalization.  Should then the Round deliver additional 
liberalization, or should it mostly consolidate (“bind” in the WTO jargon) the huge stock 
of past liberalizations?  Section II shows that this question puts the focus on the 
“technology” to be used by trade negotiators.  Developing such a technology has been the 
main task of the trade negotiators from the July 2004 Framework and the 2005 Hong 
Kong Ministerial to the July and December 2008 mini-Ministerials.  The resulting 2008 
“draft texts” are generally seen as the “best estimates” of a possible Doha Round 
Agreement.4
Fourthly, how could one negotiate on services, a still largely uncharted territory of 
the Doha Round despite the fact that services represent 50 to 70 percent of the GDP of 
the WTO Members?  Section V argues that there are good reasons—the specificity of 
protection in services and, more importantly, the political economy of liberalization in 
services—to believe that multilateral negotiations in services will be largely confined to 
binding unilateral liberalizations undertaken before a Round.  Taking into account these 
 
4 For simplicity sake, this chapter refers to the draft texts of the July and December mini-
Ministerials as the 2008 draft texts. 
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factors suggests that a plurilateral approach involving only the ten or so largest WTO 
Members may be the necessary pre-requisite for concluding a Doha deal in services. 
The concluding section addresses briefly two issues which are likely to dominate 
the world-trade debate after a successful conclusion of the Doha Round.  Firstly, to what 
extent has the current global economic crisis strengthened the chances to conclude the 
Doha Round?  Secondly, which improvements does the crisis suggest for the WTO 
machinery itself—as distinct from a Round? 
II.  The “Values” of the Doha Round 
How should the “value” of the Doha Round (as of any Round) be assessed?  
There are several dimensions—complementing each other—to this question.  First is to 
compare the outcome of the Doha Round with the outcomes of the Rounds held under the 
aegis of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (hereafter GATT) during the last 60 
years.  Such a long term comparison shows a surprisingly good performance of the Doha 
Round on the one issue that is common to all these Rounds, that is, tariff cuts on 
industrial products.  A second dimension is provided by the estimated impact of a 
successful Doha Round on world welfare, the traditional measure of economists.  This 
approach shows that most of the gains from the Doha negotiations come from its wide 
scope of issues, much broader than the scope of its GATT predecessors.  Lastly, the value 
of the Doha Round mirrors another specific feature.  As it occurs after a long period of 
unilateral liberalization by many countries, its capacity to deliver “certainty” by legally 
binding all these unilateral commitments in a multilateral setting is a source of potentially 
huge benefits. 
The Value in “Productivity” Terms:  The Doha Round and Its Predecessors 
Most observers give a low value to the Doha Round because of the endless 
negotiations.  However, using as an input, the length of the negotiations, for assessing an 
outcome in terms of the value of the Doha Round is not appropriate.  Rather, one needs to 
have some sense of the “productivity” of the Doha Round.  The most obvious, albeit 
crude, measure of a “Round productivity,” is the average worldwide tariff cut agreed on 
during a Round divided by the number of year of negotiations for the Round (Messerlin, 
2007a).  This measure has the additional merit to allow a comparison with all previous 
Rounds. 
Table 1 provides the length of the negotiations (in months) of the nine Rounds, 
the average tariff cut agreed during each of these Rounds, and the productivity for each 
Round defined as the average tariff cut by year of negotiations.  It assumes that the Doha 
Round would be concluded by December 2010, and that the worldwide tariff cut that it 
would deliver would be the lowest tariff cut mentioned in the December 2008 draft text 
(like the Swiss25 coefficient, see Section IV). 
Table 1 provides three key results.  Firstly, the Doha Round would deliver 
roughly the same average tariff cut by year of negotiations (5 percentage points) 
compared to all its predecessors but the Geneva I and Kennedy Rounds.  This result is 
remarkable all the more because large tariff cuts at the start of a trade liberalization 
process (as in the Geneva-I Round) seem much easier than cutting, 60 years later, the 
remaining tariffs of industrial sectors which have been able to develop the political clout 
to keep their protection largely intact during all these years. 5
Table 1.  Comparing the “Productivity” of the Rounds, 1947-2010 
Rounds Dates Length Tariff cuts "Round
(months) [a] Productivity" All G77
Geneva-I 1947 8 26,0 39,0 19 7
Annecy 1949 8 3,0 4,5 20 8
Torquay 1950-51 8 4,0 6,0 33 13
Geneva-II 1955-56 16 3,0 2,3 35 14
Dillon 1960-61 10 4,0 4,8 40 19
Kennedy 1963-67 42 37,0 10,6 74 44
Tokyo 1974-79 74 33,0 5,4 84 51
Uruguay 1986-94 91 38,0 5,0 125 88
Doha  [b] 2001-10 120 50,0 5,0 146 98
Number of Members
 
Notes:   
(a) Average cuts in bound industrial tariffs.   
                                                 
5 That said, the welfare gains provided by the tariff cuts of the Doha Round are likely to be 
smaller than those provided by the tariff cuts of the first Rounds because the latter were mostly 
imposed on high tariffs.  This aspect is taken into account with the second way to define the value 
of a Round. 
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(b) Assuming that the Doha Round will conclude in December 2010, with 
the implementation of a Swiss25 tariff reduction for the emerging 
economies and a Swiss10 for the developed countries (for details, see 
Section IV). 
Source:  Updated from Messerlin (2007a).   
Secondly, the size of the WTO membership or its structure (the share of 
developing countries in the total WTO membership) has no visible impact on the 
productivity of a Round.  Leaving aside the Geneva-I and Kennedy Rounds, the Round 
productivities are surprisingly stable over the years.6  Such a result, confirmed by 
experienced negotiators (Groser, 2007), reflects the fact that GATT Rounds are 
dominated by large countries.  Up to the Uruguay Round concluded in 1995 once the 
United States and European Community were close to agreement on the key issues at 
stake, the other Members were strongly induced to join the emerging agreements, though 
of course they tried their best to influence the final outcome (if only at the margin). 
Lastly, two Rounds (Geneva-I and Kennedy Round) have an outstanding 
productivity.  The case of Geneva-I is easy to explain.  The immediate post-WWII years 
witnessed redundant tariffs, pervasive quotas, exchange-rate constraints, all factors that 
made it easy to decide a first set of large tariff cuts.  By contrast, the high productivity of 
the Kennedy Round is puzzling at a first glance, and seems mostly due to improved 
negotiating “technology” (see Section IV). 
The Value in Terms of Welfare Gains:  The Wider Scope of the Doha Round 
The preceding assessment of the value of a Round has two limits.  It does not 
reflect necessarily well the welfare gains (the preferred measure of economists) delivered 
by a Round.  And it ignores that the Doha Round has a much wider scope of issues than 
its GATT predecessors since, in addition to tariffs imposed on industrial goods (an issue 
dealt with by all the Rounds), it also covers tariffs imposed on agricultural products, non-
tariff barriers imposed on industrial goods, barriers to trade and investment in services, 
and trade facilitation—to mention the most important topics. 
 
6 The Kennedy Round witnessed a doubling of the GATT membership and was the first Round 
with a majority of developing Members—and yet, it was the second most productive Round. 
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The potential world welfare gains to be delivered by the Doha Round are thus a 
combination of the welfare gains of all these various components (and of improved rules, 
if any).  As of today, no modeling exercise is able to take into account all these 
components, if only because of a lack of adequate data.  Available estimates are limited 
to the tariffs in the goods sector, hence substantially underestimate the value of the whole 
Doha Round.  Before leaving this narrow context of tariff cuts in agricultural and 
industrial goods, it is worth mentioning two studies (Laborde, Martin, and van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2009a; 2009b), which suggest global welfare gains amounting to US 
dollars 160 billion from trade liberalization in goods alone, even after allowing for all the 
exceptions to liberalization (see Section IV).  Such gains are substantially larger (up to 
twice) the gains generally mentioned.  The reason is that these two exercises use much 
more disaggregated trade and tariff data.  Hence, they take into account high tariffs as 
compared to the previous exercises, since cutting high tariffs is the main source of 
welfare gains.7
Getting a better sense of such a value thus requires an ad hoc approach that 
calculates the welfare gains associated with each of the four components covered by the 
Doha Round, without trying to integrate them into one global and interactive approach.  
Such a piecemeal approach provides the following results (Adler et al., 2009).  Tariff cuts 
in agricultural and industrial goods would have an estimated impact of trade gains on 
GDP amounting to roughly USD 100 billion.  Full liberalization (tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers) in three industrial sectors (chemicals, electronic and environmental goods) 
would generate an impact of similar size (USD 100 billion).  A modest liberalization in 
services would also have an impact of similar size (USD 100 billion). 
Lastly, the potential gains from improvement in trade facilitation (which covers 
all the trade costs, such as transit, border fees and formalities, trade regulations, etc.—all 
issues related to the Doha Round because they have a substantial component of services) 
would amount to USD 385 billion of gains.  An alternative way to express the importance 
of trade facilitation in the Doha Round context is to say that reducing trade costs by 2 to 4 
 
7 Economic analysis shows that welfare losses are a function of the square of the tariffs. 
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percent would have the same effect on trade volumes as a successful Doha Round 
(Hoekman, Martin, and Mattoo, 2010; Hoekman and Nicita, 2010). 
In sum, the welfare gains from a successful Doha Round (defined on the basis of 
the 2008 draft texts) would range from USD 300 to 700 billion. 
The Value in Terms of Certainty:  The Doha Round as a “Binding Round” 
Coming back to the context of trade in goods, looking at the applied tariffs for 
assessing the value of the Doha Round overlooks another aspect of the value of a 
Round—indeed, the most important aspect of GATT for its founding fathers.  
GATT/WTO negotiators conclude agreements in terms of “bound” tariffs.  WTO 
Members can apply tariffs that are lower than their bound tariffs, but the bound tariffs are 
the only ones that, according to WTO rules, an importing country cannot raise without 
compensating its affected trading partners.  In short, bound tariffs are the only ones that 
deliver the legal certainty that the business community values so much. 
Table 2 shows that the average applied tariff of the 34 countries that account for 
roughly 90 percent of world trade and GDP under WTO rules is roughly 7 percent in the 
manufacturing sector in 2007.8  Such a moderate level mirrors the substantial unilateral 
tariff cuts that were implemented in the 1990s and early 2000s by many developing and 
emerging countries, following China’s successful liberalization.  To a much smaller 
extent, it also mirrors the tariff cuts generated by preferential trade agreements.9  In short, 
there are less and/or smaller tariffs to cut left to the Doha Round (and to its successors, 
see the concluding section).10
 
8 These numbers leave aside only three large economies: Algeria (not yet a WTO Member); 
Russia (still negotiating WTO accession, but imposing an average tariff of 10.5 percent), and 
Vietnam (still implementing WTO accession, with a targeted average bound tariff of 10.4 percent 
at the end of its accession period).  
9 Preferential agreements have a limited impact for a host of reasons:  most of them are recent, are 
on a bilateral basis, have complex rules limiting their impact on trade flows, etc.  Such 
agreements are estimated to amount to 10 percent only of the liberalization effort (World Bank, 
2005). 
10 This evolution explains that the successive estimates of the welfare gains to be delivered by the 
Doha Round negotiations in goods have declined as time went on.  The gains calculated in the 
mid-2000s are smaller than those calculated a few years before.  For instance, they would amount 
to an increase of world welfare of 0.5 percent (Polanski, 2006) compared to a 1,5 percent increase 
Table 2. Bound and Applied Tariffs of the 34 Largest WTO Members, 2008 
Notes:  (a) at current exchange rates.  (b)  at purchasing power parity exchange rates.  (c)  annual growth 
rates of real GDP over the 2000-2006 period.  (d) the tariff water is the difference between the average 
bound and applied tariffs.  (e) EU27 is counted as one WTO Member.  (f) in percent of the World total. 
Total
WTO billions billions Real imports average imports average imports
Members US$ US$ growth US$ bound applied tariff US$ bound applied tariff US$
[a] [b] [c] [a] tariff (%) tariff (%) water [d] [a] tariff (%) tariff (%) water [d] [a]
The 8 largest "true" WTO Members
EU27 [e] 14554 12634 2.1 1697 3.9 3.8 0.1 1016 15.1 15.0 0.1 124
United States 13202 13202 2.7 1918 3.3 3.2 0.1 1348 5.0 5.5 -0.5 104
Japan 4340 4131 1.6 580 2.4 2.6 -0.2 297 22.7 22.3 0.4 65
China 2668 10048 9.8 791 9.1 9.1 0.0 579 15.8 15.8 0.0 51
Canada 1251 1140 2.5 358 5.3 3.7 1.6 280 14.5 17.9 -3.4 24
Taiwan 365 n.a. 2.8 203 4.8 4.6 0.2 138 18.4 17.5 0.9 10
Hong Kong 190 267 4.7 336 0.0 0.0 0.0 305 0.0 0.0 0.0 12
Macao 14 20 12.9 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1
[f] [f] [f] [f] [f]
All 78.1 66.8 2.9 67.1 4.1 3.9 0.3 67.1 13.1 13.4 -0.4 62.7
The next 26 largest WTO Members
Brazil 1068 1708 2.9 96 30.8 12.5 18.3 66 35.5 10.3 25.2 6
India 906 4247 7.3 175 36.2 11.5 24.7 85 114.2 34.4 79.8 7
Korea 888 1152 4.6 309 10.2 6.6 3.6 178 59.3 49.0 10.3 19
Mexico 839 1202 2.2 268 34.9 11.2 23.7 222 44.1 22.1 22.0 19
Australia 768 728 3.1 139 11.0 3.8 7.2 106 3.3 1.3 2.0 8
Turkey 403 662 4.6 140 16.9 4.8 12.1 93 60.1 46.7 13.4 8
Indonesia 364 921 4.9 80 35.6 6.7 28.9 53 47.0 8.6 38.4 7
Norway 311 202 2.2 64 3.1 0.6 2.5 50 135.8 57.8 78.0 5
Saudi Arabia 310 384 3.4 70 10.5 4.7 5.8 56 20.0 7.6 12.4 9
South Africa 255 567 4.1 77 15.7 7.6 8.1 55 40.8 9.2 31.6 4
Argentina 214 618 3.1 34 31.8 12.3 19.5 30 32.6 10.2 22.6 1
Thailand 206 604 5.0 131 25.5 8.2 17.3 87 40.2 22.1 18.1 7
Venezuela 182 203 3.8 34 33.6 12.7 20.9 29 55.8 16.4 39.4 4
Malaysia 149 301 4.7 131 14.9 7.9 7.0 101 76.0 11.7 64.3 9
Chile 146 208 4.2 38 25.0 6.0 19.0 23 26.0 6.0 20.0 3
Colombia 136 363 3.9 26 35.4 11.8 23.6 22 91.9 16.6 75.3 3
Singapore 132 144 4.6 239 6.3 0.0 6.3 175 36.5 0.1 36.4 7
Pakistan 129 406 5.1 30 54.6 13.8 40.8 17 95.6 15.8 79.8 4
Israel 123 179 1.6 50 11.5 5.0 6.5 36 73.3 19.7 53.6 4
Philippines 117 463 4.6 54 23.4 5.8 17.6 40 34.6 9.6 25.0 4
Nigeria 115 169 5.5 22 48.5 11.4 37.1 18 150.0 15.6 134.4 3
Egypt 107 352 4.2 21 27.7 9.2 18.5 10 96.1 66.4 29.7 5
NewZealand 104 110 3.2 26 10.6 3.2 7.4 19 5.7 1.7 4.0 2
Peru 93 188 4.7 15 30.0 9.7 20.3 10 30.8 13.6 17.2 2
Kuwait 81 67 5.5 16 100.0 4.7 95.3 13 100.0 4.0 96.0 2
Bangladesh 62 320 5.6 16 34.4 14.2 20.2 10 192.0 16.9 175.1 3
[f] [f] [f] [f] [f]
All 17.5 26.5 4.1 26.2 27.6 7.9 19.7 27.1 65.8 19.0 46.8 24.8
Gross Domestic Product Industry Agriculture
simple averagesimple average
Source:  WTO Secretariat, Trade Profiles, (http://www.wto.org).  Author’s computations.   
                                                                                                                                                 
calculated a few years before (World Bank, 2002).  This decline largely reflects two decades of 
unilateral industrial tariff cuts by many countries. 
8 
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Delivering certainty is particularly important in the case of the Doha Round 
because the 1990s and 2000s have witnessed substantial liberalizations that are not yet 
bound.  Table 2 shows that, out of the 34 largest economies, only eight impose applied 
tariffs at their bound level (Messerlin, 2008).  The 26 other largest economies—more 
than one fourth of world trade and GDP, and growing at rates twice those of the U.S. or 
the EC—have bound tariffs higher than their applied tariffs, often by 20 to 40 percentage 
points.  Hence, these economies are potential major defaulters in tariff matters at any time 
and with no penalty.  Moreover, the “tariff water” (the difference between bound and 
applied tariffs) is likely to be higher for the high tariffs, meaning that binding such tariffs 
would bring even greater welfare gains in terms of certainty. 
It is difficult to estimate the “value of binding” aspect of the Doha Round because 
it requires to define the “default” policies that the 26 countries listed in Table 2 could 
implement, if these countries would decide to increase their applied tariffs up to their 
bound rates.  World trade is estimated to decline by 8 to 10 percent (Bouët and Laborde, 
2009; Australian Productivity Commission, 2009) and the world GDP by US$ 900 billion 
(2 percent)—strongly suggesting that the value of binding of the Doha Round is its most 
outstanding contribution to the world trade regime. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that such estimates do not take into 
account two key factors.  First, they do not reflect the fact that the unexpected magnitude 
of the current economic crisis has increased the value of binding of the Doha Round to 
the extent that it has substantially increased the risks of default.  Second, the above 
estimates ignore the opportunity costs imposed on the world trade regime by the fact that 
trade officials are so busy with the Doha negotiations that they have no time to look at 
other pressing major issues, such as the relations between climate change and trade policy 
(a point briefly evoked in the concluding section). 
III.  Wasted Early Years (2001-2004) and Long-lasting Mistakes 
The Doha Round is generally seen as very similar to GATT Rounds.  This 
apparent continuity hides major differences that have made very difficult the launch of 
the Round, and are still imposing costs on its negotiating process. 
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The core of these differences is as follows.  GATT was deeply conscious of the 
fragility of the world trade regime that it established, and of its many limits—a narrow 
membership, a scope limited to industrial goods, the absence of a robust litigation 
process, etc.  In sharp contrast, the WTO was conceived with a boundless confidence in 
the new regime.  It seemed that no issue could escape the WTO reach—services, trade-
related intellectual property rights, strong litigation, the principle of linking together all 
the topics discussed during a Round (the so-called “Single Undertaking”), etc.  Including 
new topics and new disciplines was simply seen as a matter of time. 
These major differences reflect the very different environments prevailing when 
the two fora were conceived.  The GATT birth witnessed a deep fragmentation of the 
world economy, divided between market-oriented (not necessarily free trade-inclined) 
countries, autarkic centrally planned economies, and developing countries fascinated by 
import-substitution policies.  By contrast, the WTO birth was witnessing the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the unilateral liberalization of former centrally-planned Central European 
economies (in such a very bold way, as in Czechoslovakia or Estonia, that it eroded the 
reluctance to more liberalization that characterized the EC approach until the Uruguay 
Round) and, last but not least, the even bolder market opening of China that led a notable 
group of developing countries to become supporters of the GATT “liberal” trade regime, 
including its traditional leading opponents (Brazil and India). 
This boundless confidence in the WTO machinery has been the source of severe 
difficulties for launching the Doha Round.  It largely explains the failure of the Seattle 
Ministerial (1999).  It induced the WTO Members to link trade negotiations and 
“development” in a tight rhetoric during the 2001 Doha Ministerial.  After a short-lived 
success, this rhetoric has been a source of bitter disillusionment at the 2003 Cancun 
Ministerial.  Finally, it has imposed costly constraints that the Doha negotiators have still 
to abide by, as explained below. 
Launching a New Round:  The Failure of the Seattle Ministerial (1999) 
During the GATT years, launching a Round was done on an ad hoc basis, if and 
when a leading GATT Member (de facto the U.S.) felt that time was ripe for making 
further progress in opening markets.  In sharp contrast, the launch of the Doha Round 
was pre-committed by the 1995 Uruguay Agreement that explicitly scheduled the launch 
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of talks on agriculture and services by 2000.  The choice of the year 2000 deserves a 
remark.  It was before the full implementation of two highly contentious Uruguay Round 
agreements—the opening of developed country markets in clothing and textiles by 2005, 
and the enforcement of the developing country obligations in trade-related intellectual 
property rights (hereafter TRIP) by 2010.  Opening a new Round when key concessions 
of the previous Round are not even close to be fully enforced was a sure recipe for 
serious troubles. 
Troubles were fast to emerge, with the collapse of the Seattle WTO Ministerial in 
1999.  During this Ministerial, the U.S. and the EC were still in the mid-1990s mood, and 
wanted to expand the WTO to new topics, particularly trade and labor.  At the same time, 
developing countries became increasingly divided.  At one end of the spectrum, the 
emerging economies were building an offensive agenda adapted to their mounting export 
capacities, targeting in particular the U.S. and EC reluctance to open their markets in 
agriculture, in some industrial sectors (those still highly protected against goods exported 
by the developing countries), and in services (including labor movement).  At the other 
end of the spectrum, the least-developed economies (LDC) were hanging on to their 
exemptions from GATT/WTO disciplines.  These divisions were increased by the rapidly 
fading hopes of many developing countries to benefit from the scheduled increased 
openness of the textiles and clothing markets in developed countries, because of the fast 
and strong rise of China’s productive capacities in these products. 
All these difficulties were greatly magnified when non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) discovered the WTO’s capacity to attract media, a feature ignored 
by the GATT.  Many NGOs appointed themselves as champions of the developing 
countries, often advocating for simplistic solutions to such complex issues as the true 
impact of the Uruguay Round TRIP Agreement on drugs, or the need of more “policy 
space” for the developing countries (see below).  It took a few years for the trade 
negotiators of developing countries to reassert themselves, and make clear that they did 
not need help from NGOs often based in, or funded by developed countries. 
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Development:  The Rallying Cry at the Doha Ministerial (2001) 
Following the Seattle debacle, the WTO negotiators put the negotiating process 
back on track in less than two years.11  Such a haste had a price.  The 2001 Doha 
Ministerial felt short to launch a fully fledged “Doha Round.”  Rather, it launched a 
“Doha Development Agenda” (DDA) with an initially very ambiguous status—for a long 
time, it was not even clear whether the DDA discussions were mere exploratory talks or 
true negotiations.  More crucially, injecting the “development” term directly into trade 
negotiations created serious problems.  It was driven by two very different reasons. 
First was a quite usual feature of the GATT negotiating process that consists in 
including in a Round all the topics of interest for all the participants, before dropping 
some of them and concluding the deal with the “surviving” topics.  The rationale for such 
an approach is to enlarge the possibilities of trade-offs among participants in order to 
facilitate the final shaping of the deal.12
The second reason was quite new.  It was the realization of how it has become 
easy for developing countries to block WTO negotiations, as illustrated at the Seattle 
Ministerial.  This capacity was generated by the principle of a “Single Undertaking” 
much more than by the sheer number of developing country WTO Members.13  The 
Single Undertaking principle states that concluding a Round requires the agreement of all 
the Members on all the topics under negotiations.  Ironically, this rule was imposed by 
the developed countries (most notably, the U.S.) during the Uruguay Round in order to 
 
11 This rapidity was in part related to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  But, it was also (mostly?) pre-
determined by the WTO approach, much less conscious of the fragility of the trade regime than 
GATT.  In this respect, it is worth noting that four years were necessary to recover from the failed 
attempt to launch a Round in 1982 and to launch what becomes the Uruguay Round at the 1986 
Punta-del-Este conference. 
12 This negotiating technique reached a climax when the Uruguay Round negotiators “traded” 
better access to the textile and clothing markets of the developed countries with the 
implementation by developing countries of stricter laws and regulations in TRIPs. 
13 That the number of development countries is not a key parameter is suggested by the fact that, 
as soon as by late 1960s, developing countries represented more than half the GATT membership.  
By the way, it should be reminded that there is no official list of developing countries in the 
WTO.  Being such a country is a decision left to each WTO Member.  Proxy lists are the 
membership of the G77 Group of non-aligned countries, or of the countries with medium or low 
GDP per capita.  Both lists do not include developed countries that still tend to consider 
themselves as developing countries in the WTO forum (Singapore, Korea, etc.). 
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force developing countries to make commitments on new trade issues (services and 
TRIPs) as a trade-off for the commitments in textiles, clothing, and agriculture that 
developed countries were ready to take.  A few years later, this principle was backfiring 
and working in favor of the developing countries—now in the position to force the 
developed countries to take into account the developing countries’ requests if they 
wanted to see their own requests accepted.14
Development:  Bitter Disillusionment at the Cancun Ministerial (2003) 
The success of “development” as a rallying cry for the Doha negotiations was 
short lived.  Before explaining the reasons for such a fate, it should be made clear that the 
ultimate objective of countries is growth and development, not trade per se.  Trade policy 
is a necessary instrument for achieving such objectives, but not a sufficient one:  many 
other domestic policies are needed.  That said, trade policy has many ways to take on 
board development concerns (as illustrated in Section III).  Explicit and multiple 
references to a broad development goal may then be more harmful than helpful, as 
illustrated by the first years of negotiations. 
The main reason is that, behind the apparent consensus on the words 
“Development Agenda,” WTO Members were quick to re-discover their disagreements 
on the relative role of trade policy and other policies in development. 
For developed WTO Members, development was seen as requiring all the aspects 
of modern governance, from market opening to the so-called Singapore issues—
competition law and policy, transparency in public procurement, disciplines in 
investment—and to issues such as labor and environmental regulations.  In particular, the 
EC was pushing hard for making the Singapore issues part of the final Doha deal.  The 
2003 Cancun Ministerial resulted in the abandonment of this approach. 
By contrast, most developing countries interpreted “development” as a way to 
restore and reinforce the notions of “special and differential treatment” (SDT) and 
 
14 At the end of the Uruguay Round, developed countries were able to impose the Single 
Undertaking to developing countries by creating a new institution (the WTO), leaving to the 
developing countries willing to benefit from the opening of the developed country markets in 
textiles and clothing, no other option than to join the WTO.  Such “blackmail” is not an available 
option in the Doha Round. 
“policy space.”  The Uruguay Round negotiations on GATT Article XVIII (the key legal 
basis for SDT) almost succeeded in reducing the notion of SDT to the narrow dimension 
of longer periods of implementation.  By contrast, the late 1990s witnessed the increasing 
recognition that development does require some policy space. 
The key question is then:  which type of policy space?  Economic analysis insists 
on a policy space centered on domestic policies, such as regulatory reforms, domestic 
taxes and subsidies in markets of goods, services and factors of production.  It repeatedly 
shows that policy space narrowly defined as trade barriers (tariffs or non-tariff barriers) is 
rarely the appropriate instrument to deal with the vast majority of development issues. 
Despite this clear message, the Doha negotiators of most developing countries 
have continuously pushed the notion of policy space to provide the freedom to impose 
trade barriers.  This has led them to build “negative” coalitions, the main objective of 
which was not to get market opening concessions from other WTO Members, but to get 
exceptions from the ongoing negotiations and future WTO disciplines on access to their 
own markets. 
          Table 3.  Negative Coalitions:  The Doha Round “Gruyère” 
Agriculture NAMA
Least-Developed Countries (LDC) 32 32
Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVE) [a] 38 37
New Recently Acceded Members (N-RAM) 10 10
Other groupings with wide exceptions [b] 4 11
Total 84 90
All WTO Members [c] 127 127
Core negotiating countries [d] 43 37
Negotiations in
 
Notes:  (a)  excluding N-RAM and other groupings.  (b)  Countries with Low Binding 
Coverage in NAMA and Net Food Importing Countries in agriculture.  (c)  Counting the 
EC as one WTO Member.  (d)  The WTO Members not pertaining to a negative coalition. 
Source:  WTO NAMA and Agriculture Chair texts, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3, 
TN/AG/W/$/Rev.4, 6 December 2008. 
Table 3 presents these negative coalitions:  the more than three-decade old “least-
developed countries” (LDC) and the new “Small and Vulnerable Economies” (SVE) and 
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“New Recently Acceded Members” (N-RAM).15  In addition, several to a dozen of 
Members have succeeded in creating groupings with wide exceptions in manufacturing 
and agriculture.  Altogether, these negative coalitions include roughly 84 to 90 Members 
which are totally or substantially exempted from the possible results of the Doha Round. 
In short, the current Doha negotiations are fully involving only 40 Members or so, 
half of them being developing and emerging economies (out of a total WTO membership 
amounting to 127 Members, the EC being one Member).  As these 40 Members represent 
more than 80 percent of world trade and GDP, the Doha Round looks like a “gruyère” 
full of small holes. 
The Doha negotiators often claim that this situation does not create sub-categories 
of negotiating Members among developing countries.  But, of course, it does.  Negative 
coalitions reduce or eliminate the incentives of small developing countries to participate 
actively in the Doha negotiations, hence to block them since most of these small 
countries are wary of further liberalization.  Ironically, they can be seen as a pragmatic 
solution to the Single Undertaking constraint offered by the small countries to the large 
WTO Members. 
From a development perspective, negative coalitions have two opposite faces.  
For their own members, they are disastrous.  They impose self-inflicted damages on the 
“opting out” countries since they substantially reduce potential trade among all their 
members and between them and the rest of the world.  By contrast, negative coalitions 
are positive for the large developing and emerging economies.  From a diplomatic 
perspective, such coalitions represent a large reservoir of small allies while, at the same 
time, they leave the large developing and emerging economies free to focus their 
offensive interests on trade with developed economies, without harming much their 
economic interests since negative coalitions represent too small a share of world trade 
and GDP. 
 
15 SVE are developing WTO Members that, in the period 1999-2004, had an average share of (a) 
world merchandise trade of no more than 0.16 percent, (b) world trade in NAMA of no more than 
0.1 percent, and (c) world trade in agricultural products of no more than 0.4 percent. 
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Development:  A Source Of Long-Lasting Constraints On The Doha Negotiating 
Process 
Amidst all these expectations and disillusionment, the WTO negotiators have 
defined four concrete guidelines defining “development-friendly” negotiations. 
Firstly, paragraph 16 of the 2001 Doha Declaration states:  “The negotiations 
shall take fully into account the special needs and interests of developing and least-
developed country participants, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction 
commitments (..)” (author’s emphasis).  The  “less than full reciprocity” provision does 
not make economic sense from a development perspective if one remembers that the 
Doha negotiations deal with bound tariffs.  Almost all the developing countries—with the 
notable exception of China—have much higher bound tariffs than developed countries.  
If they want to boost their growth by guaranteeing access to their markets, developing 
countries should thus cut their bound tariffs more than the developed countries.  Cutting 
bound tariffs more severely than developed countries does not necessarily mean that 
developing countries would cut their current applied tariffs, or that they could not have 
longer implementation periods than the developed countries—two simple and usual ways 
to take into account the relative fragility of the development process within the trade 
negotiating framework. 
Secondly, paragraph 24 of the 2005 Hong Kong Declaration states:  “(..) we 
instruct our negotiators to ensure that there is a comparably high level of ambition in 
market access for Agriculture and NAMA.”  This statement links the liberalization of the 
industrial markets of the developing countries to the liberalization of the agricultural 
markets of the developed economies.  From a purely economic perspective, this second 
criterion seems neutral.  But, combined with the “less than full reciprocity” provision, it 
could constitute a strong incentive for creating a large and powerful “unholy coalition” 
between developed countries reluctant to liberalize their agriculture and developing 
countries reluctant to liberalize their industry. 
Thirdly, the Doha negotiators have imposed on themselves a “sequencing” in the 
timing of the negotiations:  agreements on agriculture and NAMA should precede serious 
negotiations in services.  This sequencing reflects the widely held view among 
developing countries that development is associated with the growth of the goods sectors 
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and not the services sectors.  It also mirrors the intrinsic difficulties in negotiating 
liberalization in services (in the WTO forum or elsewhere).  For instance, how to measure 
the concessions that a country is ready to give in some services and those that the trade 
partners are ready to offer in other services?  In goods, the technique is well oiled:  it is 
generally based on comparing the country’s trade-weighted tariff cuts with the trade-
weighted tariff cuts offered by the country’s trading partners.  In services, such an 
approach is impossible because there are no tariff equivalents of the barriers to trade in 
services.  The constraint on sequencing has greatly contributed to put services on a 
sideline, a counter-productive situation for the whole Doha Round since services are such 
a large share of domestic GDP in all the countries. 
Lastly, development has been an excuse for not requesting any commitment from 
the LDC—the so-called “Round for free” for the LDC.  Sadly, developed countries led by 
the EC have supported such a view as a way to get LDC support for their own agenda.  A 
“Round for free” imposes a heavy cost on the LDC.  From an economic perspective, it 
deprives them from the progressive liberalization that they need for increasing their 
growth and development.  From a negotiating perspective, the “Round for free” has 
allowed developed countries not to offer to the LDC a fully free access to their own 
markets, but to limit their commitments to offer a “duty free-quota free” (DFQF) to only 
97 percent of their tariff lines (at the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial).  Such a proposal is of 
very limited interest for the LDC that export only a few goods, often covering less than 3 
percent of the tariff lines. 
IV.  At Last on Track (2004-2008) and Improving the Negotiating Technology 
The Doha negotiators have spent endless hours on trying to define the 
“modalities” of the negotiations—that is, the broad framework of the Doha Agreement in 
terms of cuts in trade barriers, exceptions to agreed cuts, time schedules of the cuts, etc.  
Such a debate has often been confused and seen as a waste of time.  This criticism is 
justified only to a limited extent.  It ignores the fact that the Doha negotiators have faced 
two unprecedented challenges. 
First, they have had to relax tight initial constraints—the constraint subjecting 
every aspect of the trade negotiations to a divisive “development” goal, and the constraint 
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of the Single Undertaking.  They needed four years to do these tasks—by eliminating 
some topics (“Singapore issues”) by generating some broadly agreed criteria for taking 
into account the development goal, and by progressively allowing “negative” coalitions 
of many small WTO Members. 
Second, and even more crucially, the Doha Round has been preceded by years of 
unilateral and preferential liberalization undertaken by many countries, mostly in 
industrial goods.  This situation, unknown by previous Rounds, raised a key question:  
how to take into account these liberalizations in the Doha Round? 
Both unprecedented challenges must be addressed to improve the technology of 
multilateral trade negotiations in order to address the following question:  how to 
liberalize and make exceptions in a forum as large as the WTO that makes country-
specific solutions inadequate, hence requires generic solutions under the form of 
“formulas.”  It took four years to provide answers to this question—starting from the 
early efforts to design the (imperfect) liberalization formula in agriculture in the 2004 
July Framework and the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial (both events were the turning 
points of the Doha Round, and witnessed the return to the pure logic of trade 
negotiations) to the 2008 mini-Ministerials “draft texts,” which provide a complete set of 
formulas, often presented as the “best estimates” of what could be a fully-fledged 
outcome of the Doha Round in trade in goods. 
The remarkable productivity of the Kennedy Round (see Table 1) reveals the 
importance of the negotiating technologies in a Round.  Before the Kennedy Round, 
GATT negotiations on tariff cuts relied mostly on offers and requests expressed on a 
tariff line by tariff line basis, a very cumbersome process.  The Kennedy Round made a 
technological leap-frog by substituting a liberalization formula to the offer-and-request 
approach undertaken until then, enabling the Kennedy negotiators to be the most 
productive of the GATT history (Baldwin, 1986). 
But, liberalization formulas require exception formulas that provide to each 
negotiating country the degree of freedom needed by its government in order to get the 
domestic political support necessary for the signature and the ratification of the 
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agreement. 16  The Kennedy Round did not generate such exception formulas for two 
reasons.  First, exceptions against exports from other developed countries have been 
provided ex post under the form of many non-tariff barriers (voluntary export restraints, 
subsidies or antidumping measures) forcing the following Round (the Tokyo Round) to 
try to discipline all these measures.  In addition, the Kennedy Round negotiators did not 
need to discuss exception formulas against developing countries’ exports simply because, 
in sharp contrast with the current Doha Round, these countries were not interested in 
defending their offensive interests, while the then emerging economies (Japan, Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) realized quickly the large rents they could get from 
voluntary export restraints and similar measures imposed ex post on their exports by 
developed countries. 
 
The Doha negotiators have thus been the first to have to look for a whole set of 
liberalization and exception formulas acceptable to the whole WTO membership.  If they 
could rely on the previous Rounds for designing the liberalization formula in 
manufacturing, they are the pioneers for the liberalization formula in agriculture and for 
the exception formulas for all the goods.  In this respect, the future WTO Rounds will 
have to draw lessons from the Doha negotiating technology—its successes and its 
failures. 
Negotiations in Manufacturing (NAMA) 
Contrary to a wide belief, the discussions on “non-agricultural market access” 
(NAMA) have been as difficult as those on agricultural products.  (NAMA is an awkward 
expression allowing to exclude the food industry from negotiations on industrial goods 
and to include it in the “agricultural” negotiations.17)  But, contrary to the case of 
agriculture, the Doha negotiators have benefited from the use of an efficient liberalization 
                                                 
16 In the Doha Round parlance, exception formulas are described as “deviations” from the 
liberalization formula or as “flexibilities.”  This section uses the term “exception formulas” for 
deviations defined in a systematic way and for a broad range of WTO Members.  It keeps the 
term “flexibilities” for exceptions specific to a very small group of countries or to individual 
countries. 
17 Note that fish products are part of the NAMA negotiations, not of those on agriculture. 
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formula tested by previous Rounds.  Difficulties were thus concentrated on defining the 
desirable role of the Doha Round since this definition determines, to a large extent, the 
type and magnitude of the exception formulas. 
The choice of an efficient liberalization formula 
The 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial confirmed the use of the “Swiss formula” as the 
key liberalization formula in NAMA.  A Swiss formula defines the post-Round tariff (T) 
for a product as a function of two parameters only:  the initial tariff (t) imposed on the 
product and the reduction coefficient (c, hereafter the “Swiss coefficient”).18  More 
precisely, it takes the following form:  T = (ct)/(c+t).  The Swiss coefficient has an 
interesting feature:  it gives the highest possible post-Round tariff.  For instance, a Swiss 
formula with a coefficient of 25 implies that the highest possible post-Round tariff will be 
25 percent. 
 
The efficiency of the Swiss formula has three dimensions:  economic (items 1 to 3 
below) domestic politics (item 4) and negotiating tactics (items 5 to 8).19  More precisely, 
the Swiss formula: 
1. Cuts high tariffs more deeply than small tariffs, hence delivering most of the 
gains to be expected from freer trade (such gains come mostly from cutting 
high tariffs). 
2. Reduces the dispersion among tariffs, hence the magnitude of the distortions 
generated by tariffs in the domestic economy—contributing to a more 
efficient allocation of resources of the country. 
3. Enlarges the tax base (when high tariffs are high enough to prevent or sharply 
inhibit imports), hence can maintain or even increase public revenues. 
 
18 For simplicity sake, what follows uses the term tariff as equivalent to tariff rate. 
19 An interesting variant of this basic formula is T = ct/(cα + tα)1/α where ‘α’ is a “political” 
coefficient (to be negotiated) aiming to reduce tariff cuts in the low tariff range, hence to boost 
political support—a feature that could be particularly useful for negotiating on agricultural 
products (see below).  I would like to thank Jean Messerlin for having suggested this variant. 
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4. Does not change the ranking of the existing tariffs (since it cuts all of them by 
the same factor), hence minimizing the conflicts among domestic firms about 
the new tariff schedule under negotiation. 
5. Makes the Swiss coefficient the only element to be negotiated since initial 
tariffs are given, except in case of specific tariffs (see next item). 
6. Requires to shift from specific tariffs (tariffs in the domestic currency by 
physical quantities of the products in question) to ad valorem tariffs (tariffs in 
percent of the world price), which are much more transparent, especially when 
world prices are volatile. 
7. Makes easy to calculate the post-Round tariff structure, hence reducing 
uncertainty for foreign and domestic negotiators and operators. 
8. Allows a differentiated approach to trade liberalization by offering the 
possibility to modulate the Swiss coefficients according to countries’ specific 
needs. 
All these points present the Swiss formula as a good illustration of the intrinsic 
capacities of trade negotiations to be pro-development, without the need to make multiple 
specific references to a “Development Agenda.”  For instance, the Swiss formula 
combines cuts of the high tariffs (high welfare gains for the liberalizing country) and the 
capacity of public budget to support the domestic policy space (public investment, 
domestic subsidies, etc.).  It removes an implicit bias against developing countries that 
tend to export products with lower unit values than developed countries’ exports, a bias 
magnified when importing countries are using specific tariffs instead of ad valorem 
tariffs.  By providing an immediate, almost costless information on post-Round tariffs, 
the Swiss formula is friendly to the small negotiating teams of most developing countries.  
Last but not least, the possibility to have different Swiss coefficients for different 
countries allows to take easily into account the various level of development of the WTO 
Members. 
That said, it took several years for many Doha negotiators from developing 
countries to recognize these pro-development features and to back up the use of the Swiss 
formula. 
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The Painstaking Definition of the Target of the NAMA Negotiations 
Should the Doha Round focus on currently applied tariffs, and cut those tariffs in 
order to provide “new additional market access”?  Or should it focus on cuts in bound 
tariffs (bringing them down to the level of the existing applied tariffs) and consolidate the 
substantial cuts of applied tariffs already delivered by the unilateral and preferential tariff 
liberalizations of the 1990s and 2000s? 
Negotiators from the developed countries favor the first target, while those of the 
developing countries favor the second goal.  However, the business community of the 
developed countries has been more ambivalent than their own negotiators.  In the early 
years of the Doha Round, the European business community issued a statement saying 
that post-Doha tariffs should not exceed 15 percent (Businesseurope, 2001) a position de 
facto consistent with the second goal since this figure is often lower than the average 
current applied tariff on industrial products in many developing countries.  By contrast, 
the U.S. business community has been insisting on cuts in currently applied tariffs.  As 
years went on, the European business community has been increasingly less comfortable 
with its initial position.  The reason was the slowness of the negotiating process which 
implied that tariffs lower than 15 percent would be enforced only by 2020 (would the 
Doha Round be concluded by 2010) and not by 2010, as initially expected by the 
European business community. 
That said, the 2008 mini-Ministerial draft text on NAMA appears clearly tilted 
towards the second target—a “binding Round.”  This outcome was quite predictable 
(Messerlin, 2007a) and it would bring substantial welfare gains (see above Section III).  
However, as of January 2010, the question of the ultimate goal of the Doha Round is not 
yet completely settled because there is still a strong opposition in some quarters, in the 
U.S. mostly. 
Table 4 summarizes the main components of the current draft text.  There are four 
Swiss coefficients, one for the developed countries and three for the developing countries 
(leaving aside the LDC which have no commitment).  It is important to underline that the 
higher the Swiss coefficient chosen by the developing countries is (the more limited the 
liberalization is), the more likely trade between developing countries is hurt.  This is 
because the pre-Doha high tariffs of most developing countries protect mostly domestic 
industries that operate also in other developing countries because of similar comparative 
advantages.  In short, the Swiss formula allows each developing country to make a policy 
choice that can be “development friendly” or not (developed countries have a pro-
development Swiss coefficient). 
Table 4.  The Liberalization and Exceptions Formulas in NAMA, December 2008 
Developed
Members
A.  Liberalization formula
Swiss coefficient Swiss8 Swiss25
B.  Exception formulas No Option A Option B Option A Option B No
coverage (tariff lines) exception 14% max 6,5% max 10% max 5% max exception
coverage (trade value) allowed 16% max 7,5% max 10% max 5% max allowed
tariff cuts half of the keeping half of the keeping
agreed tariffs agreed tariffs
formula unbound formula unbound
or no cut or no cut
Developing Members shall chose one of the three following
Swiss20 Swiss22
Swiss coefficients
 
Source:  WTO NAMA Chair, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3, 6 December 2008. 
Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of the various agreed liberalization 
formulas.  The horizontal axis gives the range of the pre-Doha tariffs (from 0 to 270 
percent, the highest tariff observed in the six emerging economies analyzed in more detail 
in Table 5).  The vertical axis gives the corresponding post-Doha tariffs for the various 
Swiss coefficients.  It shows that the target of the European business community (no 
tariffs higher than 15 percent) will not be met only if the pre-Doha tariffs in the 
developing countries are very high—higher than 40 percent (with a Swiss25) or than 60 
percent (with a Swiss20). 
Figure 1.  Comparing the pre- and post-Doha tariffs, December 2008 
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Note:  The horizontal axis illustrates the pre-Doha tariffs and provides the post-Doha tariffs for the four 
Swiss coefficients agreed in the December 2008 draft text (see Table 4). 
This observation raises the following questions:  how frequent and how high are 
the “peak” tariffs—defined as tariffs higher than 15 percent?  Answering these questions 
requires more detailed information provided in Table 5 for five major emerging 
economies and Korea. 
Before looking at peak tariffs, Table 5 sheds some light on the average post-Doha 
tariff by country, a crude indicator of the global impact of the Doha draft text.  The 
average post-Doha bound tariffs would be smaller by 1 to 2 percentage points than the 
currently average applied tariffs.  In short, the view of the Doha Round as a “binding” 
Round should not hide the fact that the current draft text provides notable additional 
access to the markets of the major emerging economies.  To put this result into 
perspective, the post-Doha average bound tariffs would range from 7.5 to 14.5 percent, 
meaning that a couple of emerging economies noted would have caught up to the level of 
bound openness of the developed WTO Members in the mid-1990s—in 1995, the EC 
average bound NAMA tariff was 6.5 percent (WTO Trade Policy Review 1998). 
 
Table 5.  Pre-Doha and Post-Doha Bound and Applied Tariffs,  
Selected Emerging Economies 
Swiss Swiss Swiss Swiss Swiss Swiss
bound applied 20 22 25 bound applied 20 22 25
India South Africa
Average tariff 36.5 15.4 12.7 13.5 14.5 Average tariff 15.6 7.7 7.5 7.9 8.4
Maximum tariff 150.0 100.0 17.6 19.2 21.4 Maximum tariff 60.0 43.0 15.0 16.1 17.6
Number peaks [b] 4544 4375 70 178 2176 Number peaks [b] 2579 1201 5 118 265
Average peaks [b] 36.8 16.1 17.0 16.5 15.6 Average peaks [b] 23.3 23.6 15.0 15.3 16.3
Mexico Indonesia
Average tariff 34.8 13.3 12.7 13.4 14.5 Average tariff 35.3 6.7 12.4 13.1 14.2
Maximum tariff 50.0 50.0 14.3 15.3 16.7 Maximum tariff 100.0 80.0 16.7 18.0 20.0
Number peaks [b] 4564 1988 0 76 175 Number peaks [b] 4411 713 8 20 2976
Average peaks [b] 35.0 20.3 -- 15.3 16.0 Average peaks [b] 36.6 16.5 15.7 16.2 15.4
Brazil Korea
Average tariff 30.8 12.6 11.9 12.6 13.6 Average tariff 9.7 6.7 5.5 5.7 6.0
Maximum tariff 55.0 35.0 14.7 15.7 17.2 Maximum tariff 262.3 259.8 18.6 20.3 22.8
Number peaks [b] 4526 1793 0 5 5 Number peaks [b] 566 80 2 2 2
Average peaks [b] 31.1 18.3 -- 15.7 17.2 Average peaks [b] 25.9 25.8 18.4 20.1 22.5
Current tariffs Post-Doha bound tariffs Current tariffs Post-Doha bound tariffs
[a] [a]
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Notes:  (a) Year 2001 for bound tariffs, 2004 or 2005 for applied tariffs, except for India (2001).  (b) Peak 
tariffs are tariffs higher than 15 percent at the HS6 digit level.  
Source:  WITS data for the years 2004 or 2005.  Author’s computations.   
Turning to peak tariffs, Table 5 provides two key results.  First is in terms of 
frequency of the peak bound tariffs.  Today, such tariffs are very common in the tariff 
schedules of all the countries examined, except Korea.  By contrast, peak-bound tariffs 
would become a rarity with a Swiss20 coefficient, and barely notable (less than 200 tariff 
lines) with a Swiss22 coefficient.  They would remain a substantial factor with a Swiss25 
coefficient only for India and Indonesia.  Second, the peak tariffs would be drastically 
cut.  The average peak tariff for these six countries would decrease from 25-35 percent 
before the Doha Round to 15-18 percent once the draft text would have been fully 
implemented.  Even more dramatically, maximum-bound tariffs would be slashed from 
55-150 percent to 15-23 percent.  Finally, the average of the post-Doha bound peak tariffs 
for these countries would range from 15 to 17 percent, except for Korea (but only for two 
tariff lines).  In other words, the Businesseurope target of “no tariff higher than 15 
percent” is largely achieved. 
The last liberalization formula targets a specific group of countries—the LDC.  In 
2005, the Hong Kong Ministerial has called upon developed countries (and developing 
countries on a voluntary basis) to grant, on an autonomous basis, duty-free and quota-free 
(DFQF) market access for NAMA products originating from least-developed countries.  
Although the draft text opens the possibility that this DFQF access should cover all the 
products originating from all the LDC, it makes the DFQF a mandatory commitment for 
only 97 percent of all the LDC exports—a threshold that would still easily allow the 
maintenance of high tariffs on the few key exports of most LDC thanks to the exception 
formulas. 
The Exception Formulas:  Building “Sanctuaries” of Highly Protected Products 
The Doha negotiators have been much less well inspired when designing the 
exception formulas.  As shown in Table 4, such formulas are available only for the 
developing or emerging countries choosing the Swiss20 or Swiss22 coefficients.  In each 
case, there are two options having the same structure—reduced tariff cuts on a notable 
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range of products (options A) or no cuts on a narrower range of products (options B).  
How to assess these two options from an economic perspective? 
Options A open the door to the use of Swiss40 or Swiss44 coefficients, meaning 
that the highest post-Doha tariffs on the products under options A would be 40 or 44 
percent.  Such tariffs are very high.  But, one should also recognize that developed 
countries, such as the EC or the U.S., still apply similar tariffs, but on a relatively limited 
number of products (textiles, clothing, leather and footwear in the U.S., and chemicals 
and photographic products in the EC).  The risk generated by options A thus flows 
essentially from their relatively wide coverage in terms of products (450 to 650 tariff 
lines in HS6 terms). 
Options Bs allow unbound tariffs or no tariff cuts.  As a result, they create much 
more severe risks of highly protected “sanctuaries.”  Since tariffs under options B remain 
untouched while the rest of the tariffs will be substantially cut, tariff dispersion (possibly 
escalation) will be amplified—making, from an economic perspective, options B much 
more costly than options A for the country adopting them (and for the exporting trading 
partners).  From a political economy perspective, such exceptions will be very difficult to 
eliminate in the next Rounds because vested interests will have huge incentives to keep 
such high barriers—sanctuaries of highly protected sectors in largely liberalized 
economies are very hard to eliminate, as best illustrated nowadays by the agricultural 
sector in developed economies). 
The 2008 mini-Ministerial draft text tries to limit such risks with the so-called 
“anti-concentration” clause that aims at avoiding the exclusion of entire sectors from 
tariff cuts.  This clause imposes that at least 20 percent of tariff lines (9 percent of the 
value of imports) in each HS tariff chapter would be subject to the full formula tariff 
reduction.  However, the impact of such a clause is ambiguous to say the least for two 
reasons.  First, HS chapters vary a lot in terms of number tariff lines and economic 
importance.  Second, this clause makes it easier for developing countries protecting a 
wide range of inefficient economic activities to continue to protect them compared to 
countries protecting a narrow range of industrial activities. 
In addition to these exception formulas, the draft text provides for five country-
specific exceptions.  However, these exceptions are much less important for the world-
trade regime than the above mentioned exception formulas because they involve mostly 
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the “negative coalitions” of small countries—hence cover a very small share of world 
trade.  That is: 
1. LDC shall be exempt from tariff reductions (the “Round for free”), and they are 
only expected to substantially increase their level of tariff bindings. 
2. SVE (the largest is the Dominican Republic) shall bind all their tariff lines, with 
an average bound tariff level not exceeding 30 percent or being less, depending on 
the current average bound tariff of the country. 
3. The New RAM (the largest ones are Ukraine and Vietnam) shall not be required 
to undertake tariff reductions beyond their accession commitments.  This 
exception has no serious negative impact because the accession negotiations have 
imposed on these countries moderate to low bound tariffs (for instance, the 
average bound tariffs after full implementation of the accession protocol will be 
5.1 and 10.4 percent in Ukraine and Vietnam, respectively). 
4. The developing countries with initial low binding coverage (the largest one is 
Nigeria) would be exempt from making tariff reductions through the formula, but 
they would be requested to bind 75 to 80 percent of their tariff lines, at an average 
level that does not exceed 30 percent. 
5. In order to soften the impact of multilateral tariff cuts on the exports of 
developing countries benefited from preferences (in other words, in order to 
minimize the consequences of preference erosion), the EC and the U.S. would cut 
more slowly a limited number of tariffs on products of key interest for a few 
developing countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri-Lanka). 
Major Pending Issues in NAMA:  Sectoral Initiatives and Non-tariff Barriers 
NAMA negotiations are dealing with two other main issues.  First, “sectoral 
initiatives” aim at full liberalization in well defined industrial sectors.  Sixteen sectors 
have been initially listed:  cars, bicycles, chemicals, electronics, fish, forestry products, 
gems and jewels, raw materials, sport equipment, healthcare, pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices, hand tools, toys, textiles, clothing and footwear, and industrial 
machinery.  Many of these sectors face serious problems, from many NTBs to addiction 
to antidumping cases to sharp downturns during the great economic crisis.  As a result, in 
most of these sectors, the current negotiations would seem to have a hard time to reach 
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the “critical mass” needed for concluding a deal.  The sectors for which a deal seems still 
possible are chemicals, electronic and electric products, and environmental products. 
The second major pending issue in NAMA focuses on the elimination of NTBs 
such as technical barriers to trade, sanitary measures, etc., or at least on the creation of 
procedures capable to solve the NTB-related trade conflicts.  The 2008 mini-Ministerial 
draft text includes legal texts submitted by various WTO Members.  Some of these texts 
focus on horizontal (non-sectoral) solutions, such as the procedures for the facilitation of 
solutions to NTBs.  Other texts are “vertical” (de facto sectoral) solutions, such as how to 
handle NTBs in the chemical sector or how to manage labeling in textiles, clothing, 
footwear & travel goods. 
 
However, a decision on whether all these proposals on sectoral initiatives and 
NTBs would move forward to fully-fledged text-based negotiations remains to be taken, 
and probably will be taken only at the extreme end of the negotiations. 
The Negotiations in Agriculture20
The term “agriculture” in the Doha Round is a (deliberate?) misnomer.  It hides 
the fact that the products covered by the Doha negotiations are of two very different 
sorts:  the farm products produced by farmers, and the food products produced by 
manufacturing firms, be cooperatives or private firms.  This misnomer raises a crucial—
always tucked away—question:  who will be the ultimate beneficiary of the post-Doha 
protection—the farmers or the food industry?  It is an important question because the 
interests of these two groups of producers are divergent in trade-policy matters.  An 
increase (in relative terms) of the protection of farm products would reduce the profits of 
the domestic food producers (it increases the relative costs of their farm inputs).  A 
relative decrease of the protection of farm products would increase the profits of the food 
producers and their ability to substitute foreign farmers for domestic farmers. 
Tensions between these two sectors are the most visible in the developed 
countries where the food sector is well developed.  Evidence provided below suggests 
that, in such countries, the major beneficiaries of the Doha Round would be the food 
 
20 See the companion chapter on agriculture by T. Josling (2011). 
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producers—not the small farmers despite the fact that such farmers are the only group in 
agriculture that public opinion in developed countries would like to see protected.  This is 
not so surprising:  the farm sector represents barely 2 to 4 percent of the GDP in 
developed countries while the share of the food sector is more than double. 
By contrast, the tensions between domestic farm and food sectors are more 
limited in many developing countries if only because the domestic food sector is less 
developed.  Agriculture defined as the farm sector is the major item of the Doha 
negotiations for most developing countries.  It represents 40 percent of GDP, 35 percent 
of exports, and 50-70 percent of total employment in the poorest developing countries 
(12, 15 and 15 to 40 percent, respectively, in the other developing countries).  Three-
quarter of the world’s poorest people live in rural areas, the proportion in the poorest 
countries being as high as 90 percent. 
That said, only a minority of developing countries is likely to specialize in 
agriculture in the long run.  But most of them need to go through a period where they 
could accumulate wealth and skills in farm-related activities, before shifting to 
manufacturing and services.  In other words, agriculture in the Doha Round is not solely 
a problem for major farm exporting countries such as Argentina, Brazil or Thailand.  It 
also is critically important for the poorest developing countries, which are often 
dependent on a very small number of farm commodities, such as sugar, cotton or rice, 
highly subsidized and protected by developed countries. 
The Uruguay Round Heritage 
The Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture was a breakthrough because it brought 
the farm and food sectors back into the WTO legal framework, after five decades of a 
general waiver.  But it has had two severe limits. 
First, it did not significantly lower the effective level of OECD farm support 
below the mid-1990s.  The estimated share of total support (from consumers and 
taxpayers to farmers in OECD countries) in farm value added was 84 percent in 1986-
1988 and still 78 percent in 2000-2005.21  The years 2007-2008 witnessed a significant 
 
21 These calculations rely on the assumption that value added amounts to 60 percent of production 
at farm gates. 
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drop of this share to 60 percent.  But, this mirrors largely the boom in world-farm prices 
during these two years, an evolution that has already been reversed.  Meanwhile, the 
number of active OECD farmers has declined more sharply since the mid 1980s, and it 
will continue to do so in the coming years because of the age structure of farmers.  As a 
result, the total support per farmer has risen in OECD countries, sending the wrong signal 
to the remaining farmers. 
Second, the Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture has de facto granted a reverse 
“special and differential treatment” (SDT) to developed WTO Members by allowing 
many exceptions for agricultural products in WTO disciplines that are routinely enforced 
for industrial products.  The Agreement imposed generous caps on export subsidies (such 
subsidies were not even countervailable until the so-called Uruguay “Peace Clause” 
lapsed in January 2004).  It allowed production subsidies having a notable impact on 
trade flows in amounts much greater than the amounts effectively disbursed, creating a 
phenomenon of “subsidy water” quite comparable to the “tariff water” observed in 
industrial tariffs.  The Uruguay Agreement also allowed a wide use of “specific” tariffs 
(denominated as a fixed sum of money per unit of product, contrary to the ad valorem 
tariffs expressed as a percentage of the world price).  Specific tariffs are automatically 
more protective when world prices decrease, that is, precisely when protection is sought 
after by farmers.  Finally, the Uruguay Agreement has introduced a generous use of 
tariff-rate quotas (restrictions combining a lower (in-quota) tariff for a specified volume 
of imports and a higher (out-quota) tariff for imports above this volume) despite the many 
shortcomings of this instrument (see below). 
Initial Mistakes:  From the 2001 Doha Mandate to the 2004 Framework 
The Doha negotiators have split their discussions into the same three components 
as used by the Uruguay Agreement:  tariff cuts (market access), domestic support 
(subsidies, whether direct or indirect, such as those through guaranteed prices) and export 
subsidies.  From 2001 to August 2003, the WTO Members spent most of their time on 
bickering how to define an export subsidy, which kind of formula to use for tariff cuts 
and for cuts in domestic support, whether the existing “boxes” (defining acceptable and 
non-acceptable domestic support) should be kept unchanged or redefined.  Very little 
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came out of these discussions, except the choice of an inefficient liberalization formula 
(the “tiered” formula) for cutting tariffs that happened to be a major flaw (see below). 
In August 2003, a few months before the Cancun Ministerial, the EC and the U.S. 
tabled a joint paper that was expected to start the real negotiations by providing figures 
on the cuts in tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies that these two countries were 
ready to envisage.  The paper did not provide these figures, and it was badly received.  
This EC and U.S. tactical mistake has had two consequences.  In the short run, it 
disbanded the U.S. and EC coalition, led to the collapse of the 2003 Cancun Ministerial, 
and, more generally, put a severe blow to the U.S. and EC leadership in the WTO.  In the 
longer run, it changed the dynamics of the negotiating process by solidifying the “Trade 
G20” coalition around three major developing economies (Brazil, China and India).22  
The various attempts by the U.S. and EC negotiators to disband this coalition by 
discouraging actual or potential members to join it were short-lived, and they were 
counter-productive because they could not really change the coalition size (almost 
entirely dependent from the three core countries and their few natural allies) while raising 
deep resentments among the countries on which pressures were exerted. 
The collapse of the U.S.-EC coalition was the starting point of a long negotiating 
process leading to concrete proposals, starting with the so-called July 2004 Framework.  
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe the tortuous path between the 2004 
Framework and the draft text of the 2008 mini-Ministerials.  Rather, what follows 
presents the 2008 draft text that includes solidified figures in terms of liberalization and 
exception formulas. 
Tariff Cuts (Market Access) 
Tariff cuts are the most crucial aspect of the negotiations in agriculture 
(Anderson, Martin, and Valenzuela, 2005).  By limiting the wedge between world and 
domestic prices, small tariffs impose strong disciplines on domestic support (they make 
such a policy very expensive) as well as on export subsidies (they reduce incentives to 
provide them). 
 
22 That made the WTO forum the first official witness of a process that culminated in 2009 with 
the emergence of the “Leaders G20” at the level of Presidents and Prime Ministers. 
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Unfortunately, the potentially high disciplining effect of tariff cuts has been 
impaired by the Doha negotiators’ choice of a “tiered” liberalization formula.  Table 6 
summarizes the Doha draft text on market access.  It shows the four tiers and the 
respective cutting formulas for two groups of countries (developed and developing).23
Such a formula is much less efficient than a Swiss formula from the three 
perspectives of international negotiations, domestic politics, and economics.  From a 
negotiating perspective, the tiered formula requires defining many parameters (the 
thresholds defining the various “tiers,” the tariff cuts to enforce in each tier, etc.) 
compared to one Swiss coefficient.  This complexity is mirrored by the fact that it took as 
much time to define one formula in agriculture for the developing countries compared to 
three in NAMA.  From the point of view of domestic politics, a tiered formula has 
awkward discontinuities that can displace the pre-Doha and post-Doha ranking of 
domestic activities in terms of tariff level.  Such a feature is very likely to trigger strong 
conflicts among the involved vested interests at the very final stage of the negotiations.24/ 
 
23 For simplicity sake, Table 6 does not show the five-tiers liberalization formula for the RAM. 
24 Such discontinuities appear at the points connecting two different tiers.  For instance, a pre-
Doha tariff of 49.9 percent would be cut to a post-Doha tariff of 21.4 percent, whereas an initial 
tariff of 50.1 percent would be cut to a post-Doha tariff of 18.0 percent.  The respective figures 
for initial tariffs of 74.9 and 75.1 percent would be 26.9 and 21.4 percent. 
Table 6.  Liberalization and exceptions formulas in agricultural tariffs, December 2008 
definition tariff cut definition tariff cut
of the tiers (%) of the tiers (%)
A.  Liberalization formulas
1.- 1.-
2.- tiers tariff cuts (%) 2.- tiers tariff cuts (%)
>75% 70.0 >130% 47.0
50-75% 64.0 80-130% 43.0
20-50% 57.0 30-80% 38.0
0-20% 50.0 <30% 33.5
3.- 3.-
4.- Applies to "old" recent Members (RAM) 4.- Target for 45 small Members: a maximum
average cut of 24%.
B.  Exception formulas
1.- coverage [b] 4,0% 1.- coverage [b] 5,3-8,0%
2.- tariff cuts normal cuts reduced 2.- tariff cuts normal cuts reduced
by 33, 50 or 66% by 33, 50 or 66%
3.- sensitive tariffs are allowed to have tariffs 3.- sensitive tariffs are allowed to have tariffs
above 100 percent. above 100 percent.
4.- 4.-
5.- coverage could be extended by 2% if 5.-
more than 30% of the products are in countries (plus LDC, SVE, N-RAM).
6.- No country-specific flexibilities.
1.- coverage [b] 12% in 2 tranches of
7% (min) & 5% (max)
2.- tariff cuts none for 5% tranche
3.-
4.- Specific conditions for SVE and N-RAM
taking into account exceptions. taking into account exceptions.
Developed countries Developing countries [a]
Target: a minimum average cut of 54% Target: a maximum average cut of 36%
to be scrapped new instrument still under discussion.
Country-specific flexibilities for a dozen of
not available
Target: an average tariff cut of 11%
the top band of the liberal. formula.
Special products Special products
Special safeguard (SSG) Special safeguard mechanism (SSM)
Time period: 5 years Time period: 10 years
Sensitive products Sensitive products
"paid" by opening tariff-quotas amoun-
ting to 3-4% of domestic consumption.
"paid" by opening tariff-quotas amoun-
ting to 3-4% of domestic consumption.
 
Notes:  (a) RAM have their own liberalization formulas based on five tiers.  (b)  Coverages are 
defined in terms of tariff lines. 
Source:  WTO Agriculture Chair text, TN/AG/W/$/Rev.4, 6 December 2008.   
Last but not least, from an economic perspective, a tiered formula cuts (much) 
less deeply peak tariffs and more strongly small and moderate tariffs than a Swiss 
formula, hence generating (much) smaller welfare gains than a Swiss formula.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 2 that uses the EC tariff schedule for farm and food products as an 
illustrative schedule.25
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25 Figure 2 relies on the ad valorem equivalents of the specific tariffs, particularly numerous in 
agriculture.  The 2008 draft text provides the detailed procedure to be followed for calculating 
such equivalents since they are very sensitive to many factors, particularly the reference period 
Figure 2 shows that most of the post-Doha tariffs in the fourth tier will remain 
(much) higher than those allowed by a Swiss42 (in the hypothetical case of a developed 
country) or by a Swiss130 (in the hypothetical case of a developing country).  The 
opposite situation is observed for the three first tiers.  In short, a tiered formula would 
leave bigger distortions in domestic and world agricultural markets, hence would allow 
the survival of more numerous and powerful lobbies fighting for high tariffs in Rounds 
following the Doha Round. 
Figure 2.  The tiered and Swiss formulas: a simulation based on the EC tariff schedule 
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and exchange rate chosen. 
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That said, which sector—farm or food—would remain the most protected in the 
post-Doha period?  A precise answer requires calculations based on the countries’ tariff 
schedules.  Table 7 provides the result of such detailed calculations, again taking the EC 
tariff schedule as an illustrative case.  It clearly shows the food sector as the winner.  
Such a result mirrors the tariff escalation solidified during the Uruguay Round, when 
high tariffs were granted to food producers for “compensating” them for their expensive 
sources of farm products.  Hence, it should also be expected for the other (developed) 
countries. 
Table 7 provides several other interesting results.  Its section A covers all the farm 
and food products.  It shows the Swiss coefficients that would provide the same average 
tariff as the tiered formulas described in the draft text.  These coefficients are substantial 
(28.5 for developed countries and 87 for developing countries) with, interestingly, the 
Swiss coefficient for developed countries not too far away from the highest Swiss 
coefficient in NAMA for developing countries.  As noted above, the Swiss formula 
would rebalance tariff cuts—cutting more food tariffs and fewer farm tariffs, a result 
more consistent with government pledges to protect small farmers than the Doha draft 
text.  Section B of Table 7 focuses on the “peak” tariffs imposed on the farm and food 
products in the EC schedule of tariffs.  It shows that peak tariffs are relatively similar for 
both types of products, but are much more frequent in the food sector than in the farm 
sector (65 percent of the number of tariff lines vs. 25−30 percent, respectively).  
Interestingly, the Swiss formula would have roughly the same rebalancing effect on the 
peak tariffs than on all the agricultural tariffs.  
 
Table 7.  The Post-Doha Winners:  The Food vs. the Farm Sectors 
Number Uruguay
of tariff Bound
lines tariffs [a] tiered Swiss28.5 tiered Swiss87
(%) formula formula
A. All tariffs
Farm commodities 117 19.7 7.8 7.8 12.2 12.7
Horticultural products 273 13.6 6.0 7.3 8.7 10.2
Semi‐processed food products 488 12.6 4.9 5.3 7.8 8.2
Processed food 1120 32.6 12.3 11.9 20.0 19.4
All farm and food products 1998 24.3 9.4 9.4 15.0 15.0
B. Peak tariffs (tariffs higher than 15 percent)
Farm commodities 42 48.9 18.8 17.3 30.0 30.1
Horticultural products 73 34.5 14.1 14.8 21.6 23.5
Semi‐processed food products 93 51.9 18.5 17.0 31.6 30.1
Processed food 711 47.8 17.5 15.7 29.1 26.9
All farm and food products 919 47.2 17.4 15.8 28.8 27.1
Developed country Developing country
Post‐Doha bound tariffs [b]
 
Source:  Table 6 (formulas) and the EC tariff schedule used as an illustrative schedule.  Author’s 
computations. 
Turning to the exception formulas, Table 6 above summarizes the three main 
types of exception formulas included in the 2008 draft text:  sensitive products, special 
products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). 
Sensitive Products.   
All WTO Members would be entitled to define “sensitive” products for political 
reasons, up to 4 percent (developed countries) to 5.3-8 percent (developing countries) of 
the tariff lines (roughly 80 to 160 tariff lines at HS6 digit).  They are eligible for reduced 
tariff cuts, but these reduced cuts have to be “paid” by the introduction of tariff-rate 
quotas (TRQ) amounting to 3 to 4 percent of domestic consumption.  It is hard to predict 
the tariff lines that will be selected.  Those with the current highest out-quota tariffs seem 
good candidates.  But, in developed countries, the competition between vested interests 
will be strong because the number of tariff lines under TRQ will decrease between the 
post-Uruguay and the post-Doha regimes (for instance, from 251 to 71 in the EC case).  
Things are even more complicated because there are additional constraints (for instance, 
the provisions on tariff escalation or on tropical products, see below) to be taken into 
account.  Simulations for the EC suggest that the EC would still be able to achieve the 
target imposed by the draft text of a minimum average tariff cut of 54 percent, although 
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the average tariff on sensitive products would only decrease from 112 to 86 percent 
(Kutas, 2010). 
At first glance, TRQ look like a attractive device because they give the impression 
of allowing a careful management of the trade opening process.  But the reality is quite 
the opposite, as already witnessed by the TRQ regime introduced under the Uruguay 
Agreement.  The major flaw of TRQ is the difficulty of predicting their ultimate impact 
because it requires a knowledge of supply and demand reactions that are rarely available 
to market operators.  This uncertainty is compounded by the lack of adequate data at the 
disaggregated HS6 level.  For instance, negotiators have been forced to lay down a 
complex procedure to calculate the “domestic consumption” (the parameter on which to 
apply the thresholds of 3 to 4 percent) at such a disaggregated level when only imports 
and exports are available, whereas production figures are available at a much higher level 
of aggregation. 
Such an uncertainty opens the door to surprising outcomes.  First, TRQ could be a 
device-freezing market entry (contrary to their stated goal) as it has been observed under 
the Uruguay Agreement.  Second,  if the domestic demand becomes smaller than the 
TRQ quota, domestic prices reflect the low in-quota tariff, and domestic producers are 
more exposed to freer trade than expected by the negotiators.  Third, TRQ could also 
favor an increase of imports, including (surprisingly) in the out-quota shares such as in 
the EC bovine or poultry meat under the post-Uruguay regime (Kutas, 2010).  Lastly, if 
the domestic demand exceeds the quota, domestic prices reflect the high out-quota tariff, 
generating huge rents.  But, who would get such rents?  The answer depends on several 
parameters, but foreign exporting firms or domestic importing (food) firms—not 
domestic farmers—are the most likely recipients of such rents. 
Special Products.   
Only developing WTO Members would be entitled to define special products 
when they feel that trade liberalization of these goods would affect the country’s “food 
security, livelihood security and rural development.”  The potential coverage for such 
products is quite wide—up to 12 percent of the tariff lines, roughly 240 tariff lines at HS6 
digit level.  Special products are eligible for much reduced tariff cuts, or even no tariff cut 
at all.  They are not to be “paid” by TRQ. 
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Special Safeguard Mechanism.   
Last but not least, the Doha draft text introduces a last type of exception formula 
under the form of a conditional “special safeguard mechanism” (SSM) made available 
only to developing and recently acceded countries.  As any safeguard, the SSM requires 
the definition of the threshold allowed to trigger the measure and the type and magnitude 
of the safeguard measure.  Discussions on these issues have failed (Wolfe, 2009), and 
have become the official reason of the collapse of the whole Doha negotiations in the 
July 2008 mini-Ministerial. 
By contrast, the Doha draft text scraps the “special safeguard” (SSG) created by 
the Uruguay Agreement for developed Members, hence contributing to the elimination of 
the “reversed SDT” enjoyed by the developed countries under the Uruguay Agreement. 
A Provisional Conclusion on Exception Formulas.   
Combined with the tiered formula, all these exception formulas would shape a 
very uneven Doha liberalization.  Farm and food products with low or moderate pre-
Doha tariffs and not subjected to one of the three exception formulas would be 
liberalized.  But, a substantial number of products—those with pre-Doha high tariffs or 
subjected to one of the three exception formulas—would remain tightly protected, 
particularly in the case of the developing countries (because of the special products and 
SSM formulas).  In short, the Doha Round Agreement based on the current draft text is 
unlikely to open markets of critical interest for the WTO Members.  In particular, trade 
between developing countries will remain highly constrained. 
Domestic Support 
The 2008 draft text introduces two layers of cuts in trade-distorting support.  First 
are the cuts in the three different “boxes” inherited from the Uruguay Round Agreement, 
that is: 
• The Amber Box (“aggregate measure of support” or AMS) covers the 
domestic support that is the most distorting because it is tightly linked to 
prices (price-support mechanisms) and/or to production, 
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• The de minimis Box covers measures of similar nature as those of the Amber 
Box, but in smaller amounts (they should not exceed 5 to 10 percent of farm 
production), 
• The Blue Box includes domestic support considered as less distorting than the 
Amber Box because it is subjected to some restrictive conditions (such as 
imposing production limits curbing potential over-production on direct 
payments based on the number of animals or on the area planted). 
All the cuts defined within each of these boxes are defined at two levels:  the 
country’s aggregate agricultural output, and the level of the country’s outputs of specific 
products.  This two-level system aims at preventing the circumvention of the Doha 
disciplines on the global domestic support through transfers between different products. 
The second layer of cuts in domestic support is based on a new concept created by 
the Doha negotiators—the “overall trade-distorting domestic support” (OTDS), which is 
the sum of the Amber, de minimis, and Blue boxes.  Hence, it defines cuts in the 
permitted amounts of the three boxes combined. 
All these cuts are achieved by a mix of tiered formulas (the EC being the only 
country in the highest tier, the U.S. and Japan pertaining to the second tier, and the other 
developed and a few developing countries pertaining to the lowest tier) and caps not to go 
beyond.  Rather than describing all these cuts and caps in detail (see the 2008 WTO 
Agriculture Chair text for a detailed description) it is more interesting to get a sense of 
the impact of the Doha draft text on the OTDS and on the Amber Box (which constitute 
the bulk of domestic support) in the case of the EC and of the U.S., the two major 
providers of subsidies. 
Table 8 presents the bound commitments taken by the EC and U.S. in the 1995 
Uruguay Agreement, the effective support granted in 2004, and the estimated support for 
2013.  It suggests three major observations.  First, the base level used by the Doha 
negotiators are the Uruguay bound commitments, as in the tariff negotiations.  Second, 
the applied level of support in 2004 is much lower (roughly half) than the bound level 
agreed in the Uruguay Round.  In other words, the “water” in EC and U.S. domestic 
support to agriculture is as substantial as the “tariff water” of the core developing and 
emerging countries in NAMA.  Third, the EC and U.S. Doha commitments defined by 
the 2008 draft text represent roughly a cut by half of the applied domestic support in 
2004, but they are in line with the applied domestic support estimated for 2013.  In sum, 
the Doha Round would essentially bind the EC and U.S. farm policies expected to prevail 
by 2013. 
Table 8  The Liberalization Formulas in Farm Support, December 2008 
U.S. EC15 [c] U.S. EC15
1.  Overall Trade Distorting Support
The Uruguay bound commitments 55.0 149.0 47.4 70.6
Effective OTDS (2004) 23.0 78.0 19.8 37.0
Estimated OTDS (2013) [d] 12.4 30.0 10.7 14.2
The Doha draft text (December 2008)
Base levels 48.2 149.0 41.6 70.6
Formula cuts (in %) 70 80 -- --
Commitments 14.5 29.8 12.5 14.1
2.  Amber Box (Aggregate Measure of Support, AMS)
The Uruguay bound commitments 19.1 90.7 16.5 43.0
Effective Amber Box (2004) 13.0 42.0 11.2 19.9
Estimated Amber Box (2013) [d] 6.9 24.3 5.9 11.5
The Doha draft text (December 2008)
Base levels 19.1 90.7 16.5 43.0
Formula cuts (in %) 60 70 -- --
Commitments 7.6 27.2 6.6 12.9
Support in
billion US dollars [a]
Support in % of
agricultural output [b]
 
Notes:  (a) Figures for the EC are expressed in Euros in the Chair text, and are translated in US 
dollars on the basis of an exchange rate of 1.35 US dollar per euro prevailing in 
December 2008.  (b) Average value added in agriculture for the years 1995-2000.  
(c) Past figures for the OTDS for the EC 27 are roughly 106 percent higher than those for 
the EC15.  OTDS for 2013 is estimated for the whole EC27.  (d) Support for 2013 are 
estimated by Kutas (2010) for the EC and by Orden, Josling, and Blandford (2010) for 
the U. S.. 
Source:  WTO Agriculture Chair text, TN/AG/W/$/Rev.4, 6 December 2008.  Author’s 
computations.   
This last observation requires an important caveat.  It does not mean that the 
whole support to EC and U.S. farmers will be sharply cut, but only subsidies tightly 
linked to prices and quantities.  The EC and U.S. remain free to shift Amber and Blue 
support to the Green box.  Such a shift would be an improvement to the extent that Green 
subsidies have a smaller impact on agricultural trade than the Amber and Blue support.  
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But, the magnitude of this smaller impact remains a debatable matter.  After all, Green 
subsidies would still induce farmers to produce more than in the total absence of support.  
In short, it is harder to assess the true liberalization impact of the Doha draft text on farm 
support that it is to assess the impact of the Doha draft text on NAMA. 
Expressing domestic support in percentage of agricultural output is interesting 
because such an expression is relatively similar to a tariff.  Based on the average value 
added in agriculture for the years 1995-2000, Table 8 shows that the Doha commitments 
would reduce the share of domestic support in agricultural output value to 12-14 percent 
in the U.S. and EC—a percentage close to the NAMA average tariff of emerging 
economies such as Brazil or India (see Table 5).  These estimates suggest that the 
criterion of “a comparably high level of ambition in market access for Agriculture and 
NAMA” imposed by the negotiators in the context of a “Doha Development Agenda” has 
been met. 
The December 2008 draft text includes many other provisions on domestic 
support, but examining them in detail goes beyond the scope of a chapter.  What follows 
flags the most important ones.  
• Almost all the commitments define precise time schedules for implementation 
and substantial downpayments for the first year of implementation.  The 
implementation time schedule and downpayments differ greatly for developed 
and developing countries, mirroring the special and differential treatment 
enjoyed by developing countries. 
• Caps on post-Doha support are defined with respect to the support actually 
provided in 1995-2000 (the product specific Amber boxes) or to the amount of 
production (de minimis box, Blue box). 
• The Uruguay Blue box (direct payments based on the number of animals or on 
the area planted are subjected to production limits ensuring to curb somewhat 
over-production) would be complemented by a new Blue box (direct 
payments based on a fixed amount of production in the past). 
The domestic support component of the draft text deserves three final remarks.  
First, the “Green” box (support deemed not to distort production or prices or, at least, to 
cause minimal distortions) provisions will be tightened for developed countries, but made 
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laxer for developing countries in order to allow such countries to purchase farm products 
for stockpiling, fighting hunger, and rural poverty, and/or buying from low-income 
farmers (even at prices higher than market prices). 
Second, there are special provisions for cotton, a product that has attracted 
significant media attention since the early 2000s.  Trade distorting domestic support for 
cotton (Amber box) would be cut more substantially than for the other agricultural 
products while the Blue support for cotton would be capped at one-third of the normal 
limit for other farm products. 
Finally, there are provisions in favor of the farmers of certain developing 
countries that have indirectly benefited from OECD domestic support via preferential 
access to protected OECD markets, as best illustrated by Mauritius (sugar) or certain 
African or Caribbean countries (bananas) in the EC markets.  Such preferential access has 
allowed these farmers to sell their products on the EC markets at European prices that 
were much higher than world prices.  The Doha draft text allows for a slower 
liberalization for products with such long-standing preferences.  The list of the products 
concerned is still under discussion.26  Such provisions are ambiguous, to say the least, 
from a development perspective.  Ending past preferences by establishing a (transitory) 
preferential regime discards the crucial fact that the farmers of the developing countries 
free riding on OECD support have been favored for decades at the detriment of the 
competing farmers of the developing countries excluded from such OECD domestic 
support. 
Export Measures 
Export measures have been among the least difficult topics to negotiate.  A 
(incomplete) draft text imposing their complete elimination by 2013 was one of the main 
outcomes of the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial.  There are several reasons for such a 
situation.  Firstly, export subsidies per se have been almost exclusively granted by the EC 
(85 percent of all export subsidies in the mid-1990s) hence putting a lot of pressures for 
reform on only one WTO Member.  Second, export subsidies have a bad reputation in 
 
26 In the same vein, in December 2009, an agreement between the EC and the Latin American 
producers of bananas that did not have preferential market access to the EC during the last sixty 
years has put an acceptable end to this five decade-long dispute. 
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many corners:  they are seen as a source of unfair international competition, as inefficient 
in terms of food aid, as tightly related to public monopolies (state trading enterprises, 
STE), etc.  As a result, they have been under constant attack from all sides, from foreign 
exporters to NGOs to domestic and/or foreign consumers, to domestic competition 
authorities, etc.  Finally, they are often perceived as subsidies targeted to large food 
multinationals—most observers forget that, in fact, the multinationals “pay back” these 
subsidies to farmers when they buy farm products at prices (much) higher than world 
prices. 
Under all these pressures, the EC has undertaken a unilateral liberalization of its 
export subsidies since the mid-1990s.  EC export subsidies have decreased from Euros 8 
billion (the EC commitment in the Uruguay Round Agreement) to roughly 3 billion in 
2003 and less than 2 billion in 2006—mirroring again a huge “subsidy water.”  In 2007-
2008, EC export subsidies had almost disappeared because of the boom in world prices in 
farm products, while less than Euros 0.6 billion for 2009 (half the 2008 amount) have 
been included in the EC 2009 budget. 
However, the 2008-2009 economic crisis has witnessed a reversal of this long 
term decline, particularly in dairy products where the EC accounts for a large share of 
international trade (from 20 to 35 percent, depending on the product).  Another factor 
raises some doubts on the ease with which a total elimination of export subsidies would 
be achieved by 2013:  if the total amount of export subsidies has declined, the quantities 
of exports still eligible has declined more slowly, suggesting the survival of a strong 
demand for such an instrument in some farm niches. 
That said, the main difficulties met by the 2008 draft text were related to the 
definition and treatment of export measures deemed “equivalent” to export subsidies, 
such as food aid, export credits, guarantees and insurance, exporting state trading 
enterprises, export restrictions, and taxes.  Until recently, such instruments do not 
represent a substantial amount of money.  Available estimates suggest that the share of 
exports subsidized by such instruments represent 2 (EC) to 5 (U.S.) percent of total 
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agricultural exports, and that the subsidy equivalent of all these instruments was smaller 
than 7 percent (Hoekman and Messerlin, 2006).27
The 2008 draft text confirms the elimination of export subsidies by 2013, and it 
imposes the same provisions on export credits with repayment periods beyond than 180 
days.  Moreover, it aims to ensure the progressive convergence of disciplines to be 
imposed on export credits, export credit guarantees, or insurance programs with 
repayment periods of 180 days or less (these programs should be self-financing, reflect 
market consistency, and be of a sufficiently short duration so as not to effectively 
circumvent commercially-oriented disciplines).  It requires the elimination of the trade-
distorting practices favored by the STE, with future disciplines curbing potential 
monopoly power (which could circumvent the disciplines on export subsidies) 
government financing, and underwriting of losses.  Lastly, the 2008 draft text aims at 
eliminating commercial displacement beyond an adequate level of food aid through the 
creation of a "safe box" for bona fide food aid in case of emergency, and through the 
adoption of effective disciplines on in-kind food aid, monetization, and re-exports so that 
there can be no loopholes for continuing export subsidization. 
Major Pending Issues in Agriculture 
The above description of topics included in the 2008 draft text is not exhaustive.  
There are, among others, specific provisions on tariff escalation (when tariffs on 
processed products are higher than those on raw materials, with a view to reduce such 
escalation when it is large enough to hinder processing for export in the country 
producing the raw materials) tariff simplification (with a view to minimize the number of 
specific tariffs) tropical products (with a view to have faster and deeper tariff cuts on 
such products), TRQ administration (shall TRQ be possible only for products already 
under a TRQ regime, and what would be the TRQ regime if it can be imposed on new 
products) and inflation (a topic covering price increases that could make void committed 
 
27 These small figures are explained by the fact that the subsidy equivalent of an export credit is 
not the total amount of credit granted, but only the subsidized component created by the 
difference between the market and preferential interest rates.  Similarly, what is at stake with the 
exporting STEs is not their whole activities, but the export subsidy equivalent provided by 
government financing and/or underwriting of losses. 
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limits and those that could create difficulties for developing countries facing sharp rises 
in food prices).  As these provisions deal with complex issues, they tend to be written in 
general terms that still remain largely open to discussion in the months to come. 
Besides this host of provisions, there are two major pending issues.  As noted 
above, the conditions for using the Special Safeguard Mechanism have not been agreed 
on yet.  The reason why negotiations have failed—the possibility, or not, to impose a 
SSM duty higher than the post-Doha bound tariff for the product in question—does not 
make much sense.  Such a possibility is routinely used in antidumping, antisubsidy and 
safeguard measures in NAMA.  For instance, it is not uncommon that antidumping duties 
on industrial products are ten times higher than bound tariffs.  
The other major pending topic is geographical indications (GI), which are ruled 
by the Uruguay TRIPs Agreement, but mostly concern agricultural products. 28  They 
witness the opposition of the WTO Members (the so-called W52 sponsors led by the EC) 
that favor a high level of GI protection based on a multilateral and mandatory register for 
wines, spirits, and an undefined number of additional products, and the WTO Members 
that favor a voluntary database on GI.  Of course, the stricter the mandatory conditions 
imposed by the register, the stronger is the implicit degree of monopoly created by the 
register. 
GI is a typical case of inertia in trade negotiations.  This topic was already part of 
the Uruguay negotiations.  It continues to be tabled by the EC even though it is 
questionable that a strong GI regime is in the EC’s own interests.  For instance, the last 
decade has given ample proof that a strong GI regime did not help the French wine 
sector.  Under the French strong GI regime for wines, some French vineyards have 
performed very well, but others very poorly—suggesting that “something else” than 
strong GI is key for success in the modern wine business.  Evidence from the last decade 
suggests that GI can have severe perverse effects (freezing the production technology, 
 
28 Article 22.2 of the Uruguay TRIPs Agreement requires Members to provide the legal means 
(i.e., GIs) to prevent the use of any means “in the designation or presentation of a good that 
indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area other than the 
true place of origin in a manner that misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the 
good,” as well as any use “which constitutes an act of unfair competition.”  In contrast with 
patents, GIs do not aim at promoting innovation, but at giving information on “reputation.” 
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generating over-production, deteriorating quality, generating systematic misinformation, 
and ignoring changes in consumers’ tastes).29  By contrast, evidence suggests that what 
counts is the existence of large wine companies (such as in Champagne) capable of 
meeting an ever changing demand while delivering the required level of quality and 
reputation via trademarks. 
V.  Uncharted Territory:  Services 
Until 2008, the Doha negotiations in services showed little progress, despite the 
fact that services represent 50 to 70 percent of the GDP of the WTO Members, and are of 
prime importance for running an efficient economy. 
The one-day “Signalling Conference” during the July 2008 mini-Ministerial was 
the first event suggesting that things could move.  Negotiators from 31 countries listed 
their offers to open domestic services markets, and their requests to get better access to 
foreign services markets.  The day was unanimously considered a success, many 
participants showing an unexpected appetite for negotiating improved market access in 
services. 
However, since then, negotiations in services seem to be back in limbo, a situation 
that raises two different questions.  Are there some intrinsic difficulties in negotiating in 
services that could explain such slow progress, beyond the mere sequencing constraint?  
If there are such intrinsic difficulties, what then could be the role of a multilateral Round 
in opening markets in services? 
The Intrinsic Difficulties in Liberalizing Services 
A frequently mentioned source of intrinsic difficulties is the fact that services are 
generally protected by regulations, rarely by tariffs or barriers that would be easily 
measurable such as tax differentials.  A second source of differences, largely ignored but 
probably more crucial, is the relative weakness of the political economy of liberalization 
in services compared to what happens in goods. 
 
29 The negative consequences of strict GI have been recently illustrated by a fraud lasting over 
two years (on 18 millions of bottles), in which the over-production of syrah and merlot noir in 
Southern France (Aude) has been sold in the U.S. markets as pinot noir (Le Figaro, 20-21 
February 2010, Cahier 2, page 1). 
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Regulations vs. Tariffs 
As services are rarely protected by measurable barriers, negotiations in services 
cannot be based on liberalization formulas comparable to those available for industrial or 
agricultural products.  There are two additional difficulties. 
First, protection in services is embedded in regulations the main initial objective 
of which was not to protect domestic services providers against foreign firms, but rather 
to protect certain domestic providers against other domestic providers.  For instance, 
regulations limiting the entry of foreign retail firms running large outlets are the late by-
product of the decision, taken two or three decades ago, to protect domestic small shop-
keepers from domestic large stores.  A corollary of this key feature is that most of the 
gains from more liberalization in services would come from non-discriminatory market 
opening, that is, liberalization with respect to foreign and domestic services providers. 
Second, opening markets in services is rarely limited to the mere dismantlement 
of the existing barriers.  Rather, it generally requires the adoption of a flow of pro-
competitive regulatory reforms in the future.  As a result, negotiating market access to 
foreign markets in services is a bet on the willingness and the capacity of the trading 
partners to deliver such a sequence of future reforms.  This process is made even more 
complicated because countries compete with each other on regulatory matters in a 
dynamic way, with the improvement of the regulatory framework in a services sector by 
a WTO Member triggering improvements of the regulatory framework of the service in 
question by other WTO Members.  Of course, all these future interactions cannot be 
easily written down in a schedule of concessions on a year by year basis.  Rather, trust in 
the reform capacity of the trading partners becomes a crucial factor of the willingness of 
a country to negotiate. 
WTO negotiations are not well equipped to deal with such a fluid and dynamic 
process.  They are handicapped by the fact that the WTO is a wide forum where 
Members are extremely heterogeneous in their capacity to deliver credible flows of 
regulatory reforms in the future.  In this context, unilateral or preferential liberalizations 
seem more suitable. 
However, the WTO handicap in terms of negotiating new market access in 
services does not extend to the binding of existing market access since binding relies on 
regulatory reforms already in place, and on the proven willingness to open the markets in 
the past.  In short, the dominant role of regulations seems simply to tilt WTO negotiations 
in services more systematically towards a “binding” approach that it is the case in goods. 
The Political Economy of Liberalization in Services 
However, there is evidence that even the consolidation of past unilateral 
liberalizations has not attracted much attention from the Doha negotiators (Gootiiz and 
Mattoo, 2009; Messerlin and van der Marel, 2009).  Which could then be the additional 
factor(s) inhibiting WTO negotiations on binding unilateral or preferential 
liberalizations? 
What follows suggests that the usual political economy of export interests (eager 
to push for opening the domestic markets in order to get foreign markets more open) and 
import-competing interests (eager to keep domestic markets protected) is markedly 
weaker in services than in goods. 
Figure 3.  Costs and benefits of market opening in goods and in services 
costs
benefits
Xg Ms Mg
Xs
B A
O
market opening  
 
Figure 3 presents a very simple framework for comparing the political economy 
of the costs and benefits of trade liberalization—the balance of forces between domestic 
exporters and domestic import-competing interests—in the case of goods (g curves) and 
of services (s curves).  The Xg curve shows the declining benefits that exporters of a 
product face as and when a market is opening.  It illustrates net benefits, that is, the 
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opportunities lost by the exporters when the market is closed minus the difficulties to be 
faced by these exporters when they get effective access to the market.  The Mg curve 
illustrates the rising costs that the import-competing producers of a product face when 
their domestic market is opening.  Hence, in the case of goods, the political “equilibrium” 
between the two lobbies (exporters and import-competitors) is A.  What follows uses the 
Xg and Mg curves and the A point as benchmarks for assessing what happens in services. 
In the case of goods, Figure 3 generally shows domestic exporters of certain 
goods (say steel) and domestic import-competing firms producing other goods (say 
clothing).  In the case of services, Figure 3 would more often illustrate the situation 
within the same service sector for several reasons:  services are more prone to 
differentiation than goods, services negotiations are more systematically sectoral than 
those in products (if only because it is easier to compare offers and requests in the same 
sector), etc. 
Looking first at the export side, several reasons reduce net benefits from market 
opening in services, compared to goods (for a description of these reasons within a 
negotiating framework, see Adlung (2009)).  These reasons prevail at the different stages 
of the opening process—negotiation, market entry, and comparative advantages. 
First, negotiating costs tend to be higher in services than in goods.  Trade 
negotiators have to invest in the knowledge of the service sector at stake and to learn 
about the regulations, contrary to goods where they need to know only the level of the 
bound and applied tariffs.  In such a context, they often have to work with the agencies in 
charge of regulating and monitoring a service, and these agencies are unlikely to facilitate 
negotiations that could challenge their power or threaten their survival. 
Second, the market entry phase requires from the exporters of the service to adjust 
their strategies to the regulations and practices in their export markets.  The available 
empirical literature suggests that such costs are (much) higher in services than in goods 
(Shepherd and Miroudot, 2009) once again making exporters of the service less 
supportive of market opening. 
Lastly, comparative advantages are fuzzier to grasp in services than in goods, 
even though services liberalization tends to be sectoral.  For instance, liberalizing 
distribution services between France and Germany may induce German retailers, efficient 
in medium-sized outlets (such as Aldi), to enter the French retail market.  For doing so, 
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Aldi has to build medium-sized outlets in France, to hire French staff, and adapt to the 
whole French regulatory environment, meaning that Aldi may lose some of its 
comparative advantages in terms of capital costs, labor skills, favorable regulations in 
Germany.  This is quite different from what happens generally in manufacturing, where 
exporting goods does not require building new factories and hiring workers in the export 
market, and adjusting its whole operations for abiding by foreign regulations (a German 
car exporter would expand its German units of production, increase its German 
workforce, and would continue to operate mostly under German law).  All these risks are 
compounded by the fact that, services liberalization being often sectoral, Aldi may be 
exposed to counter-offensives from French competitors in another segment of the retail 
market (for instance, the French retailer Carrefour may try to enter the German 
hypermarket segment) precisely when Aldi tries to enter the French market. 
To sum up, the three above-described forces go in the same direction—reducing 
the net benefits from market opening.  As a result, the Xs curve for exporters in services 
lies below the benchmark Xg curve for goods. 
Turning to the import side, the Ms curve for services would lie above the Mg 
curve for goods for reasons echoing those on the exporting side.  First, import-competing 
service providers will need to face adjustment costs in their domestic market.  But, 
because of the more frequent sectoral feature of services liberalization, they may also 
have to pay costs for entering some segments of the foreign exporters’ market.  Second, 
services often involve regulatory agencies that are likely to support the import-competing 
vested interests.  Thus, the two forces described above go in the same direction:  the Ms 
curve for import-competing services lies above the Mg curve for goods. 
The political-economy global equilibrium in services would be located at the left 
of point A (say B) meaning a more limited market opening (see the horizontal axis) in 
services than in goods.  Note  that, on the vertical axis, the equilibrium level of costs and 
benefits in services associated with point B could be higher or lower than the level 
associated to the point A.30
 
30 Interestingly, the fact that the political economy may be weaker in services than in goods has 
no clear-cut ex post impact on the adjustment costs to liberalization.  For instance, the labor force 
that French distributors have to fire could be easily re-employed by the German distributors. 
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What then could be reasonably expected from the Doha negotiations? 
The Report on the successful 2008 “Signalling Conference” does not provide any 
precise information on the offers and requests evoked (it does not even mention the 
names of the countries specifically interested in each service).  However, it sheds some 
qualitative light on the intensity and scope of the services to be liberalized among WTO 
members that is summarized in the two first columns of Table 9.31
Column 1 gives a sense of how many participants manifested a serious interest in 
negotiations during the Signalling Conference.  Column 2 focuses on the interest shown 
for two modes: mode 3 on the right of establishment and mode 4 on the movement of 
natural persons.  These two modes were the most contentious during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations (WTO Secretariat, 2000) and, during the Doha Round negotiations, services 
providers have repeatedly underlined their crucial role.  Altogether, the two columns 
reveal a willingness to negotiate, with a high number of participants interested in each 
service, a high occurrence of offers and requests on mode 3, and even a willingness to 
include mode 4 (by far the most contentious aspect of international negotiations in 
services because it is often misperceived as a source of illegal immigration). 
Columns 3 and 4 rely on an older source of information, namely the EC and U.S. 
offers tabled in 2005 before the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial.  These offers were 
notoriously limited, reflecting the highly uncertain state of negotiations in manufacturing 
and agriculture at this time.  However, even if these offers do not provide adequate 
information on the magnitude of the offers tabled in 2008, they are useful because they 
give a first sense of the services in which the EC and the U.S. were already ready to move 
in 2005.  This is particularly the case for the EC offers that tabled notable additional 
commitments, be it in terms of widening (binding the most recent ECMS at the level of 
EC 1995 commitments) or deepening (offering new commitments for the EC as a whole 
in terms on market access or national treatment).32  The U.S. offers present a less clear 
                                                 
31 Table 9 relies on Messerlin and van der Marel (2009). 
32 The information in columns 3 and 4 relies on calculated indicators measuring how much the 
EC and the U.S. were willing to move (in terms of widening and deepening and for the four 
modes of supply) for each service listed in their offers (WTO, 2005a; 2005b).  Weights have been 
given to each mode of supply by service in order to reflect their relative economic importance 
when aggregating the various modes.  These weights are those used by the World Bank’s World 
picture, with no notable proposals for two-thirds of the services sectors, as shown by 
column 4.  Finally, it should be underlined that the market-opening moves in columns 3 
and 4 would not necessarily occur in the entire broad sector:  they may be observed in 
some sub-sectors only. 
Table 9:  Revealing the Willingness to Negotiate in Services 
Size of Crisis
Services Nbr WTO GATS mode sectors resilience
Members underlined EC US (US$ bn)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Business Services Virtually all 4 yes no 4918 High
Communication Services Substantial 3 yes yes 737 High
Distribution Services Substantial 3 yes no 3809 --
Environmental Services Substantial 3 some no -- --
Construction & Related Engineering Substantial 3 & 4 some no 1715 High
Transport Services Substantial 3 some some 1282 Low
Financial Services Notable 3 yes small 1770 Low to High
Educational Services Notable 3 & 4 no yes 1444 --
Tourism and Travel Related Services A few yes no 774 Low
Health and Social Services A few 3 & 4 no no 1483 --
Recreational, Cultural & Sporting -- -- small no 1217 --
Energy Substantial 3 -- some -- --
Signalling Conference 2008 2005 offers:
market opening moves
 
Notes:   Column 1 reports the number of WTO Members having expressed interests in negotiating 
the service mentioned.  The TNC Chairman’s Report includes a separate paragraph for 
audiovisuals, with two WTO Members expressing interest.  Column 2 reports the explicit 
mention of modes 3 and 4 for the service at stake.  Columns 3 and 4: see text.  Column 5 
gives the total size in billions of US$ (PPP) in the U.S., EC and Top 8 group markets by 
service.  Note that Recreational services includes the Personal, Community and other 
Social sector, while Educational services include R&D services.  Column 6 reports the 
resilience of services to the current economic global crisis as reported by Mattoo and 
Borchert (2009).  Crisis resilience is low in financial services, and high in insurance. 
Source:  Columns 1 and 2: TNC Chairman’s Report of 30 July 2008; Column 3: WTO 
(2005a); Column 4: WTO (2005b); Column 5: OECD (2006); Column 6:  Mattoo and 
Borchert (2009). 
Columns 5 and 6 provide important information from an economic perspective.  
Column 5 gives the market size of the services listed in billions of USD (at the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Trade Indicators for calculating the bound-level regulatory constraints. 
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purchasing power parity exchange rates) for a group of ten countries.33  Market sizes are 
a key factor determining the magnitude of consumer welfare gains and of firms 
opportunities, hence the likelihood and magnitude of the negotiation success.  That the 
size of the agricultural and industrial markets for the ten countries amounts to roughly 
US$7,900 billion and gives a good sense of the size of the market at stake in services. 
In particular, Table 9 suggests three services sectors (business services, 
communications and distribution) as a particularly rich potential source of negotiating 
successes. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Since 2007, the world economy has been under great stress—first because of 
burgeoning commodities prices, then because of the “great economic crisis” that started 
in September 2009.  These turbulences raise two questions with a quite different time 
line. 
Short-term Perspectives:  Concluding the Doha Round 
What could be the impact of the economic crisis on the Doha negotiations in the 
short and medium term?  It is often said that trade negotiations are easier during crises.  
But, the current crisis is so much more severe and global than the previous ones 
(Baldwin, 2010) and its exit phase may be so perilous that the past does not look to be a 
robust guide. 
That said, the great fear prevalent in mid-2008 of a significant slippage in 
protection during the crisis did not materialize—so far (Messerlin, 2010).  During the 
eighteen months, none of the key countries that could have easily (from a WTO legal 
perspective) increased its applied tariffs to the higher bound levels (see Table 2) has done 
so.34
 
33 The ten countries (Brazil, Canada, China, EC, Japan, India, Korea, Mexico, Russia, and the 
U.S.) produce more than 80 percent of the value added in the dozen or so services sectors with 
available infomation in National Accounts.  For details, see Messerlin and van der Marel (2009). 
34  The only country showing signs of reversal is Russia, not a WTO Member. 
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This happy surprise may have a positive impact on the Doha deal.  By not 
increasing their applied tariffs up to their (much) higher bound tariffs during the current 
crisis, the key emerging and developing economies have shown their revealed preference:  
they have kept unchanged their applied tariffs for their own benefit.  This behavior 
undercuts their claim that they provide a huge favor to developed countries when cutting 
their bound tariffs, hence that they should get generous exception formulas.  
Consequently, negotiators from the key developing and emerging countries should 
abandon such a claim, and agree on tightening somewhat the exception formulas, 
particularly the options B in NAMA. 
However, it takes two to tango.  Such a restraint on their current requests by the 
key developing and emerging economies should be met by a similar restraint by the 
developed WTO Members on their own requests.  In particular, developed countries 
should abandon their claims for additional market access (deeper cuts in the applied 
tariffs than those already agreed by the developing and emerging economies) and agree 
on a “binding Round.”  If they do not make such a move, developed countries should be 
ready to face the collapse of the Doha Round (or  its long hibernation), hence the risks 
associated to permanent huge “water” in the key developing and emerging markets of 
goods and services.  The costs of such risks are likely to increase in the future, with the 
increasing economic size of the key developing and emerging countries (once bigger, 
these key countries may feel increasingly free to behave unilaterally). 
It remains that restraints in agriculture and NAMA negotiations from both sides 
will not be enough to conclude the Doha Round.  There is the need for an additional, 
mutually beneficial, booster that only services can provide.  Services can attract the 
support of the business community much more than any other conceivable trade-related 
issue (such as intellectual property rights, norms, non-tariff barriers, public procurement, 
rules, etc.).  They are the largest source of opportunities for firms for three reasons:  their 
sheer size (50 to 75 percent of GDP), their ubiquitous presence (even manufacturing or 
agrobusiness firms have a significant share, often about 50 percent, of their turnover in 
services), and their high level of protection—services are on average twice more 
protected than goods (Shepherd and Miroudot, 2009).  The sheer binding of the services 
liberalization of the last fifteen years would provide sizable gains for consumers all over 
the world. 
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The question then is:  how to relax the constraints of the Doha sequencing (getting 
results in agriculture and NAMA before negotiating in services) and of the complexity of 
services negotiations.  One possibility would be to start exploratory talks on services in a 
much smaller forum than the WTO, before repatriating them in the WTO if these talks 
are promising (Messerlin and van der Marel, 2009).  For instance, such talks would be 
limited to the largest world economies—roughly ten, a group small enough to keep 
negotiations manageable and large enough to cover more than 80 percent of world 
production in services.  Such talks could start by a transatlantic, transpacific (APEC) or 
Eurasian dialog—it does not really matter because as soon as such a dialogue starts, 
dynamic forces will expand it to the other, not yet involved, large economies.  
Alternatively, such talks could start directly under the aegis of the G20 Summits.  If 
promising, the results of these talks would then constitute the embryo of Doha 
negotiations in services. 
Medium and Long-term Perspectives:  WTO Reforms 
Clearly, the nature of the WTO is changing.  A successful Doha Round would 
make this evolution even clearer because it will leave developed countries with 
insignificant tariffs, key developing and emerging economies with moderate bound tariffs 
and often small applied tariffs.  In short, the times of wide-ranging negotiations on tariffs 
would be almost over for 80 percent of the world trade—it is “death by success.”  The 
WTO current business as the key negotiating forum on tariff cuts in goods will be mostly 
limited to the large but fragmented group of small developing economies. 
Does this mean that the WTO as it is has lost its centrality (Baldwin and 
Carpenter, 2009)?  Not really, for three reasons.  First, the WTO negotiating process in 
goods will remain central for the many small developing countries that have chosen to 
join negative coalitions in the Doha Round (see section II).  The development impact of 
multilateral trade negotiations between these countries will thus remain high.  Second, the 
WTO will remain the ultimate forum for all its Members for binding market access in 
services—once again by far the largest share of economic activity in every domestic 
economy.  Last but not least, the WTO will keep its role of “rule guardian,” based on its 
dispute settlement mechanism. 
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All this requires reforms of the way the WTO works.  First, Rounds should be 
shorter and more frequent.  This is not a new idea, but so far, it has been justified by 
unconvincing reasons, such as negotiator fatigue.  It has a much firmer ground when it is 
understood that short Rounds would fit much better the agendas of the business 
community (which looks for quick results) as well as the political constraint imposed by 
the fact that, during the last three decades, democratically elected governments lack 
strong majorities, hence are unable to deliver grand visions (Messerlin, 2007b). 
Second, the Single Undertaking principle needs to be reviewed.  In the Doha 
Round, it has fuelled a process of systemic evasion through “negative coalitions.”  The 
inevitably ad hoc definitions of such coalitions generate an irrational, chaotic and 
ultimately unjust WTO forum (a coalition may be accessible to some Members, but not to 
other very similar countries).  The Single Undertaking principle should be re-interpreted 
as enforceable at distant periods of time, not at every Round (as it was de facto the case 
under the GATT regime).  Between two enforcements, Members should be allowed to 
“discriminate positively,” that is, to open further their markets by participating to 
plurilateral agreements (Codes in GATT parlance) without waiting for an agreement 
among all the Members. 
These two suggestions focus on WTO traditional roles.  In order to increase its 
centrality, the WTO should also start to tackle activities that it has left aside so far 
because its whole energy was focused on negotiations.  One of the most urgent tasks is an 
adequate monitoring of the Members’ obligations.  Today, such a monitoring is 
extremely poor.  In this context, the current crisis has opened interesting perspectives.  In 
2009, the WTO (with the OECD and UNCTAD) has been asked by the G20 Summits to 
monitor changes in tariffs and measures that could become trade barriers. 
That is an interesting start.  But, such a monitoring is of little help if there is no 
reasonably informed benchmark of the changes in tariffs and other trade barriers that are 
routinely taken by the WTO Members.  Interestingly, a first attempt to provide such an 
estimate suggests a non-negligible routine of 4 percent of tariff line changes every year 
(Bouet and Laborde, 2009).35  Such benchmarks are crucial for assessing the true level of 
 
35  These estimates rely on tariffs alone at the HS6 level.  According to Evenett (2009), this 
threshold has been reached during the last 18 months.  However, Evenett’s calculations are based 
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resilience to crisis of trade policies in the coming years.  Another possible extension of 
the monitoring activities would be an economic analysis of the potentially most damaging 
trade barriers. 
These tasks will keep the WTO central whether it has the direct capacity to do 
them or whether it has only the capacity to flag the issues.  For instance, the WTO is the 
best equipped international institution for monitoring tariff increases, but it is not for 
monitoring increases in subsidies or for analyzing the most dangerous shifts in 
antidumping activity (likely to be seen beyond the WTO mandate by a large share of its 
membership).  It remains that flagging these issues would be a robust contribution of the 
WTO to the world trade system. 
Last but not least, the WTO could envisage a reform of international disciplines, 
for instance stricter rules in subsidies.  However, such a goal requires serious analysis.  
The disappointing example of the EC rules in subsidies during the past years (these rules 
are much stricter and economically sound than the WTO rules) shows that enforcing 
strict international disciplines relies crucially on domestic institutions capable of raising a 
strong domestic voice supporting international disciplines.  Such domestic institutions are 
essential for shifting the attention away from the costly and inefficient policy space 
offered by trade policies to the much wider, better targeted, and more efficient domestic 
policy space delivered by the many available domestic policies.  All this is particularly 
true for the trade-related issues—adjustment policies, norms and standards in goods, 
regulations in services, climate change, etc.—that will make the WTO busy in the 
future.36
 
on HS4 data, and include many trade barriers other than tariffs.  As a result, a rigourous test needs 
yet to be done. 
36 As of today, the best illustration of such institutions is Australia’s Productivity Commission 
(2009).  Such domestic institutions have two key additional virtues.  First, by nature, they are 
very sensitive to the risk of attrition of competition in the markets of many goods and services 
often generated by deep crises.  Second, their strength may allow taking some risks in the world 
trade regime and in the WTO—for instance, when opening or re-opening the thorny negotiations 
on the rules on contingent protection (particularly, safeguards). 
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